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Abstract
This Note examines historical and current attempts to settle claims on dormant Swiss bank
accounts and proposes a mechanism designed to resolve the dispute. Part I provides background
information on the claims, including the relevant Swiss law, obstacles encountered by earlier
claimants, and the Swiss Government’s early resolution attempts. Part I also outlines frameworks
of international arbitral and adjudicatory forums employed to resolve international disputes. Part
II discusses the attempts of the Swiss banks, Swiss Government, U.S. Congress, private individ-
uals, and independent organizations to resolve claims to dormant Swiss bank accounts. Part III
argues that the current mechanisms are inappropriate for handling claims on dormant Swiss bank
accounts and proposes an alternative mechanism that is better designed for settling claims based
on its ability to offer final resolution to both claimants and banks. This Note concludes that the
only effective way to settle the dispute over dormant Swiss bank accounts is to implement this
propsed hybrid forum for the final resolution of claims.
HEIRS WITHOUT ASSETS AND ASSETS WITHOUT HEIRS:
RECOVERING AND RECLAIMING DORMANT
SWISS BANK ACCOUNTS
Jodi Berlin Ganz*
The difficulty in providing in advance a permanent solution
of all ... questions is indeed great. But greater is the danger
which lies in the policy of leaving them undetermined in the
vague hope that a solution may after all never be required.'
INTRODUCTION
With the intrigue of a wartime spy novel, the activities of
Hitler's Nazi era have unfolded in recent months with the de-
classification of World War II documents.2 The declassified doc-
uments have produced evidence of looted gems,' stoler art-
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University. This Note is dedicated to the
memory of my father whose encouragement motivated me to finish. I would like to
thank the office of Senator Alfonse D'Amato for providing me with copies of
declassified documents.
1. HERBERT ARTHUR SMITH, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT AS AN INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL 117 (Scientia Verlag Aalen 1977) (1920).
2. See, e.g., Clyde Haberman, Bank's Gold Inspires Tales of Plunder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1996, at B1 (reporting on declassified documents that suggest Switzerland still has
US$6 billion in Nazi-stolen gold); David E. Sanger, Swiss Bank Shreds War-Era Data But a
Suspicious Guard Halts It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1997, at Al, A4 [hereinafter Swiss Bank
Shreds War-Era Data] (reporting on declassified U.S. intelligence report concerning
shipment of German gold bars from Switzerland to Spain and Portugal between May
1943 and February 1944); see also Holocaust Victims Assets in Swiss Accounts: Hearings
Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996),
available in LEXIS, LEGIS Library, CNGTST File [hereinafter House Hearings] (state-
ment of Edgar M. Bronfman, President, WorldJewish Congress and WorldJewish Resti-
tution Organization). Mr. Edgar Bronfman testified before the U.S. House Committee
on Banking and Financial Services about research in U.S. National Archives that yielded
declassified U.S. intelligence reports detailing stolen artwork and Nazi shipments of
looted gold to the Swiss National Bank. Id.
3. See, e.g., Memorandum of Fdration Beige des Bourses de Diamants, June 8,
1950, at 1 (regarding Belgian Government's claim for restitution of 180,000 carats of
industrial diamonds representing remainder of larger quantity seized and confiscated
by Nazi authorities during German occupation of Belgium in World War II) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal). The newly declassified documents detail
the degree to which the Nazis looted the diamonds of France, Holland, and Belgium to
help finance the war. Stewart Ain, Looted Jewish Gems Surface, Says Dealer, JEWISH WEEK,
Nov. 1, 1996, at 1, 18 [hereinafter Looted Gems Surface]. The U.S. State Department
made the documents available at approximately the same time a New York state gem
dealer aborted the sale of a large quantity of gems originating in Germany, on suspicion
that the Nazis had stolen the gems during World War II. Id.
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work,4 and laundered gold,5 some of which Nazis may literally
4. See, e.g., U.S. Foreign Economic Administration, Looted Art in Occupied Terri-
tories, Neutral Countries, and Latin America, May 5, 1945 (describing German policy
for plundering art in occupied territories) (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal). Nazi Germany based its policy on plundering monuments, fine art, and
archives in the occupied territory on two principles: "(1) [m]oral and material enrich-
ment of the German nation, and (2) material enrichment of individual Nazis, predomi-
nately Party bosses." Id. at 4. The Nazis attempted to secure their financial future in
the event of a defeat by legalizing their actions with a sales certificate or exchange
paper, signed by the seller through force. Id. at 3.
Another recently declassified U.S. State Department document disclosed that in
1945, U.S. troops discovered an estimated US$800 million worth of looted assets that
the Nazis hid in a salt mine in Merkers, Germany. Stewart Ain, Swiss Hid Art Treasures
Looted By Nazis, JEWISH WEEK, Oct. 4, 1996, at 18. The assets today would be worth
approximately US$34 billion. Id. The whereabouts of these valuables are unknown.
Id. The document revealed that among the looted assets were 53 paintings that were
"definitely looted" and another 58 that were "'ostensibly' looted." Id. Ajournalist writ-
ing a book about artwork that the Nazis stole estimated that 20% of the paintings and
art objects the Nazis stole from France, almost 10,000 pieces, are still missing. Id. A
confidential report by the French Audit Office, dated December 7, 1995, found that a
total of 1955 works of art stolen primarily from Jewish collectors during the war were
currently in French museums. Roger Cohen, France to Look for Property Stolen From Jews in
World WarI1, N.Y. TiMEs,Jan. 28, 1997, atA4. In response, France established a commit-
tee to identify and locate property stolen fromJewish families during World War II and
to determine the value and legal status of that property. Id.
5. See, e.g., Official Dispatch of the Office of Strategic Services, Jan. 12, 1946 (re-
vealing identification of source willing to give details about 280 truck loads of German
gold sent from Switzerland to Spain and Portugal between May 1943 and February
1944) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); German Gold Movements
(Estimate) From April 1938, to May 1945, Feb. 5, 1946 (concluding that "[a]ll gold that
Germany sold after a certain date, probably from early 1943 on, was looted gold, since
her own reserves, including hidden reserves with which she started the war, were ex-
hausted by that time.") (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
A declassified confidential memo from wartime Foreign Economic Administration,
dated January 27, 1945, discusses evidence of Swiss assistance to the Nazis which served
to finance the Nazi purchase of war material. Patricia Cohen, A Holocaust Account to Pay;
Survivor Sues Swiss Banks for Withholding Family's Lost Money, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1996,
at A01. The confidential memo also suggests that Swiss aid to the Nazis was profit-
motivated. Id.; see generally Robert Vogler, The Swiss National Bank's gold transactions with
the German Reichsbank from 1939 to 1946 (1984) (discussing gold dealings between Swiss
National Bank and German Reichsbank during World War II). Robert Vogler was the
Swiss National Bank's archivist from the fall of 1982 until the fall of 1984. Id.
At the end of World War II, Switzerland agreed to hand over stolen gold deposited
by Nazi Germany in Swiss banks during the course of the war. Haberman, supra note 2,
at B1. Switzerland surrendered gold, presently valued at about US$700 million, to the
United States, Britain, and France (the "Allies"). Id. U.S. and British forces found an
additional US$2 billion in gold in Germany. Id. A panel of Allies, the Tripartite Com-
mission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, distributed the money to central banks of
ten European countries with claims against Germany. Id. On February 3, 1997, the
Allies agreed to freeze the distribution of the final US$68 million until officials could
resolve outstanding allegations that the Swiss intentionally underestimated how much
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have ripped from the mouths of their victims.6 The documents
have also aided the attempts of heirs of Holocaust victims to re-
claim what may amount to billions of dollars in assets trapped in
Swiss bank accounts. 7
In the wake of the allegations stemming from declassified
documents, relations between the World Jewish Congress8 and
Nazi gold they had on deposit and that the Swiss National Bank intermingled gold
plundered from central banks with gold belonging to Jewish victims. David E. Sanger, 3
Nations Agree on Freezing Gold Looted ly Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at Al, All.
6. Haberman, supra note 2, at B1. The WorldJewish Congress found a 1946 confi-
dential letter to Washington, D.C. from the U.S. Embassy in Paris stating that gold bars
found in a German salt mine might "'represent melted down gold teeth fillings.'" Id.
7. William Drozdiak, Swiss Confront Collaboration with Hitler - Bank Inquiry Jolts Coun-
try's Conscience, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, at 42. In 1995, the Swiss Bankers Associa-
tion conducted its own audit of its bank accounts and, in February 1996, announced
that it had located only US$32 million found in 775 accounts that might belong to
Holocaust victims. Emma Daly, A 64bnFranc Question, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 1,
1996, at 2-3. Representatives of Jewish organizations claim that perhaps as much as
US$7 billion remains unclaimed in dormant accounts. Drozdiak, supra, at 42. Elan
Steinberg, Executive Vice President of the World Jewish Congress said that a significant
part of that US$7 billion represents money from unpaid life insurance policies. Stewart
Ain, Policy of Deceit? Survivors of Holocaust Victims Claim Swiss Are Cheating Them of Life
Insurance Benefits, JEWISH WEEK, Jan. 17, 1997, at 18 [hereinafter Policy of Deceit]. The
three largest commercial Swiss banks include the Union Bank of Switzerland, Credit
Suisse, and Swiss Bank Corporation. PESTALOZZI GMUER & HEIZ, BUSINESS LAW GUIDE
TO SWITZERLAND 111, at 14 (CCH Europe Inc. 1991) [hereinafter BUSINESS LAW
GUIDE]. Parties making claims are concerned with money found in these commercial
Swiss banks. See, e.g., Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96 CV 4849
(E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 3, 1996, Am. Compl. filed Jan. 24, 1997) (class action suit filed on
behalf of Holocaust survivors naming Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corpora-
tion, Credit Suisse, and others asjoint defendants); Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzer-
land, No. 96 CV 5161 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 21, 1996) (class action suit filed on behalf of
heirs of Holocaust victims naming Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation,
and Credit Suisse as joint defendants); World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communi-
ties, Inc. v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 97 CV 0461 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 29, 1997)
(class action suit filed on behalf of Holocaust survivors and their descendants world-
wide, naming Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation, and Credit Suisse as
joint defendants).
8. See Stewart Ain, Swiss Set To Settle Holocaust Case, JEWISH WEEK, Jan. 17, 1997, at 1
[hereinafter Swiss Set To Settle] (discussing World Jewish Congress's involvement with
Swiss officials to settle issues). On May 2, 1996, Edgar M. Bronfman, President of the
World Jewish Congress, was one of seven signatories to an agreement establishing the
Volcker Commission, which is currently overseeing an audit of dormant Swiss bank ac-
counts in hopes of matching accounts with claims. Memorandum of Understanding,
May 2, 1996, between The World Jewish Restitution Organization, The World Jewish
Congress, and The Swiss Bankers Association, [hereinafter Volcker Agreement] (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal). In December 1996, the WorldJewish Con-
gress conducted private talks with Swiss Ambassador Thomas Borer, the lead Swiss offi-
cial in the investigation of Swiss dealings with the Nazis. Swiss Set to Settle, supra, at 1. In
early January 1997, former President of Switzerland, Jean-Pascal Delamuraz, personally
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the Swiss Government have often flared.' The Swiss Ambassador
to the United States resigned after a leaked dimplomatic cable
revealed contentious comments regarding Swiss bank activity. 10
Jewish leaders spoke openly about a possible boycott of Swiss
banks after the outgoing Swiss President made inflammatory re-
marks about the World Jewish Congress' efforts to secure a fund
for Holocaust victims."l The Swiss President's apology, intended
to ease relations, fell on deaf ears after a security guard discov-
ered a Swiss bank employee shredding Government-protected
documents dating from World War II.12
apologized in a letter sent to World Jewish Congress president, Edgar Bronfman, for
remarks that the World Jewish Congress was blackmailing Switzerland into paying
money into a Holocaust fund. Id.
9. See Alan Cowell, Swiss Offer To Start Fund For Victims Of Holocaust, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
8, 1997, at A6 [hereinafter Swiss Offer To Start Fund] (discussing growing confrontation
between Switzerland and Jewish groups in United States and Israel).
10. David E. Sanger, Swiss Envoy to U.S. Resigns After His Report on Holocaust Dispute is
Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, at A4. Carlo Jagmetti, Swiss Ambassador to the
United States, resigned after publication of comments from his confidential strategy
paper regarding how to handle disclosures about Switzerland's role as banker to Nazi
Germany, which concluded with the warning "this is a war which Switzerland must con-
duct on the foreign and domestic front, and must win." Id. Additional references char-
acterizing the groups representing Holocaust victims as "opponents" who "cannot be
trusted" heightened the negative reaction to Jagmetti's reference to "war". Id. The
Swiss Ambassador would have retired in the summer of 1997. Id.
11. Alan Cowell, How Swiss Strategy on Holocaust Fund Unraveled, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
1997, at A6. In late December, 1996, outgoing Swiss President Jean-Pascal Delamuraz,
relying on information in Swiss Ambassador Jagmetti's strategy paper, accused the
World Jewish Congress of "extortion and blackmail" in its attempt to secure a fund for
Holocaust victims. Id. Avraham Burg, the chairman of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem
said Jewish groups would decide whether to urge a boycott of Swiss Banks. Swiss Offer
To Start Fund, supra note 9, at A6. Reacting to Swiss bank foot-dragging, by early Febru-
ary 1997, New York lawmakers, including the New York State Governor and the New
York City Council, proposed kicking Swiss banks out of New York, revoking operating
licenses, or barring official deposits in Swiss banks if Swiss banks did not open their
banks to auditors searching for Jewish accounts. Johanna McGeary, Echoes of the Holo-
caust, TIME, Feb. 24, 1997, at 37, 40.
12. Swiss Bank Shreds War-Era Data, supra note 2, at Al. On January 14, 1997, a
security guard at the Union Bank of Switzerland halted the shredding of papers dating
back to World War II. Id. Investigators said the documents consisted of archives assem-
bled by a subsidiary that had extensive dealings with Nazi Germany. Edmund L. An-
drews, Swiss Bank Cannot Identify Papers in Cache It Shredded, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1997, at
A3. In its defense, the bank reported that an in-house historian had reviewed the hun-
dreds of pounds of documents shredded before the guard stopped the disposal and
had judged them to be of little importance. Edmund L. Andrews, The Rescuer of Swiss
Bank Ledgers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1997, at A6. If the documents the bank destroyed did
relate to Nazi assets, then the bank violated a month-old Swiss law ordering banks to
preserve any remaining records of dealings with Nazi Germany. See Federal Decree
Concerning the Historical and Legal Investigation of the Fate of Assets Which Reached
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The dispute over the dormant bank accounts took root at
the end of World War II, when the heirs of Holocaust victims
unsuccessfully attempted to access Swiss bank accounts they
claimed were rightfully theirs under Swiss inheritance law.13
Contributing to claimants' continuous lack of success are the
Swiss bank secrecy laws, originally instituted in 1934 in an effort
to protect assets from confiscation by the growing Nazi regime, 4
which have instead hindered the process of recovering those as-
sets.15 These laws have prevented banks from issuing public no-
Switzerland as a Result of National Socialist Rule, December 13, 1996, art. 4 (visited
Mar. 6, 1997) <http://www.Swissemb.org.nago2.htm> [hereinafter Swiss Federal De-
cree of Dec. 13, 1996] (prohibiting destruction of records useful to Swiss investigation)
(also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The new law subjects people
deliberately violating the decree to imprisonment or a fine of up to 50,000 Swiss francs.
Id. art. 9. This amount is equivalent to US$36,000. See Swiss Bank Shreds War-Era Data,
supra note 2, at Al, A4 (reporting that law calls for imprisonment or fine up to
US$36,000 for destruction of records). It will be difficult for inspectors to determine if
the bank violated the law, however, because the bank's in-house historian did not keep
an inventory of documents he reviewed. Andrews, supra, at A3.
13. See Peter Hug & Marc Perrenoud, Assets in Switzerland of Victims of Nazism
and the Compensation Agreements with East Bloc Countries, Jan. 17, 1997, pt. II,
<http://Swissemb.org/nago.htm> (visited Mar. 2, 1997) [hereinafter Historians' Re-
port] (providing examples of unsuccessful attempts to claim Swiss bank accounts) (also
on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); Swiss Offer To Start Fund, supra note
9, at A6 (discussing allegations that Swiss banks hoarded bank deposits belonging to
Holocaust victims). Under Swiss inheritance law, persons claiming an inheritance by
law must establish a parental or marital tie to the deceased person. See INTRODUCTION
TO Swiss LAW 78 (F. Dessemontet & T. Ansay eds., 2d ed. 1995) (discussing inheritance
requirements).
Following World War II, in order for an heir to inherit, the Swiss authorities had to
declare a person missing and dead. Jacques Picard, Switzerland and the Assets of the
Missing Victims of the Nazis, § 4.2.2, at 7 (1993) [hereinafter Picard Report] (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal). After a period of time elapsed, the authori-
ties registered assets and established their existence. Id. The local authorities then
appointed a delegate administrator who sought the owner through official Swiss publi-
cations. Id. A long process of declaring a person missing and presumed dead followed
the publication. Id. If the authorities declared the person missing and dead, the au-
thorities sought heirs through local official publications, which culminated in a five
year waiting period during which heirs had free use of any assets claimed. Id. A 1962
Swiss Federal Resolution simplified the process for registering non-Swiss assets belong-
ing to persons presumed missing and dead. Id. § 4.5, at 10-12.
14. See William A. Lovett, Conflicts In American Banking Regulation: Renewed Pru-
dence, Retrenchment, and Struggles Over Growth Potential, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 443 n. 11
(1993) (noting that secrecy laws prevented Nazis from identifying owners of accounts).
15. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 2 (testimony by Edgar Bronfman, president
of WorldJewish Congress, on information in declassified documents that raise concerns
about the Swiss banks' role in World War II). A document from the U.S. National
Archives, dated August 15, 1947, noted that a claimant seeking information about the
status of a bank account would have to "supply proof of the decease of the person or
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tice of dormant accounts in the hope of contacting the rightful
heirs, because such notice would risk infringing banking and
professional secrecy laws.16 Beginning in 1995, the Swiss
banks, 17 Swiss Government,18 U.S. Congress,19 private individu-
als,2" and independent organizations have tried to facilitate this
recovery process.21
persons in whose names the account or accounts are recorded, as well documentation
that [the claimant] is either the sole heir or represents the heirs of the deceased." Id.
This is difficult, however, because Nazis did not keep a list of victims they systematically
gassed to death at the concentration camps. See Alan Cowell, File Search Casts Light on
Victims of Nazi Era, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 9 [hereinafter File Search] (reporting on
work of International Tracing Service, formed in 1946 to document and identify victims
of Nazi persecution). At least half of the Jews who perished in the Holocaust died in
the concentration camps. See RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUGrION OF THE EUROPEANJEWS
767 (1961) (noting that Nazis killed 3,000,000 Jews in camps out of estimated total
5,100,000).
16. See Historians' Report, supra note 13, pt. 111(3) (c), at 19; Picard Report, supra
note 13, § 4.5 at 11 (noting that obligation to maintain professional secrecy hindered
matching of victims' assets with heirs).
17. See Institute of International Bankers, Global Survey 1996 136 (Sept. 1996)
[hereinafter Global Survey] (discussing Swiss bank regulation relaxing claiming require-
ments) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
18. See, e.g., Historians' Report, supra note 13, introduction (discussing Swiss Gov-
ernment's commissioning of one report to investigate assets in Switzerland belonging to
Nazi victims and post World War II compensation agreements between Switzerland and
East Bloc countries). Two Swiss historians completed the research and presented the
report on January 17, 1997. Id. The Swiss Government also established an independ-
ent commission of experts to conduct a historical and legal investigation of the extent
and fate of assets located in fiduciary and non-fiduciary institutions. Swiss Federal De-
cree of December 13, 1996, supra note 12, art. 2(1). Swiss officials expect this commis-
sion to dovetail with the Volcker Commission, which is overseeing an audit of dormant
accounts located in Swiss banks. House Hearings, supra note 2 (testimony by Ambassador
Thomas Borer). The issues of wartime Swiss gold dealings with Germany involve the
Swiss National Bank, while the alleged unwillingness of Swiss banks to cooperate in the
identification of dormant accounts belonging to Holocaust victims involves only the
commerical banks. Alan Cowell, 3 Swiss Banks Plan To Establish Fund For Nazis' Victims,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at Al, A12 [hereinafter Fund for Nazis' Victims].
19. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 2 (discussing Holocaust victims' assets in
Swiss bank accounts); Banking Deposits of wIlI Jews In Swiss Banks: Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996),
available in LEXIS, LEGIS Library, CNGTST File [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (concern-
ing Banking Deposits of WWII Jews in Swiss Banks).
20. See, e.g., Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849 (setting forth class action suit filed on be-
half of Holocaust survivors); Friedman, No. 96 CV 5161 (setting forth class action suit
filed on behalf of heirs of Holocaust victims); World Council, No. 97 CV 0461 (setting
forth class action suit filed on behalf of organized group of Holocaust survivors and
their descendants worldwide).
21. See Volcker Agreement, supra note 8 (establishing independent committee
composed of Swiss representatives and Jewish representatives to oversee audit of dor-
mant accounts).
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On March 5, 1997, Swiss President Arnold Koller proposed
the establishment of a US$4.7 billion "Swiss Foundation for Soli-
darity" (the "Foundation") funded by money resulting from an
increase in the stated value of Swiss gold reserves to correspond
to current gold market levels.2 2 Under President Koller's propo-
sal, the Foundation would provide aid to victims of genocide and
other severe breaches of human rights, including Holocaust vic-
tims. 23 The proposed Foundation is still subject to the Swiss Par-
liament's approval of a Constitutional amendment to allow for
the revaluation. 24  This aid would supplement the long-term
needs of Holocaust victims not covered by the US$140 million
humanitarian fund ("Humanitarian Fund") established for vic-
tims of the Holocaust 25 and funded by Switzerland's three largest
banks26 and the Swiss National Bank.2 7 The banks established
22. Swiss Press Release, Switzerland In World War II President of the Swiss Confedera-
tion Addresses a Joint Meeting of the Federal Assembly, Mar. 5, 1997 (visited Mar. 10, 1997)
<http://Swissemb.org/pr970305.html> (also on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) [hereinafter Swiss President's Address]. Switzerland previously estimated the
value of its gold at one-third of the world market price in order to keep its value low.
Alan Cowell, Swiss to Use Gold for a Holocaust Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1997, at A6 [here-
inafter Swiss to Use Gold].
23. Swiss President's Address, supra note 22. Each year the Foundation would use the
interest from the fund estimated at several hundred million US dollars. Swiss to Use
Gold, supra note 22, at A6. Half of the money would be spent in Switzerland, and half
abroad. Id.
24. Swiss To Use Gold, supra note 22, at A6. An amendment could require a refer-
endum among the Swiss people. Id. The Foundation faces strong opposition by the
members of the Swiss People's party who feel Switzerland should not face punishment
for its wartime neutrality. Alan Cowell, Swiss and Their Burden of Nazi Gold, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1997, at A8. Christopher Blocher, the leader of the Swiss People's party, noted
that this Foundation "is about demands for money from Switzerland. What is not so
clear is what Switzerland should be paying this money for." Id. Furthermore, three of
seven Swiss Government Cabinet members did not support President Koller's plan, ar-
guing that it was too hasty. Id. The Swiss Government and Swiss National Bank had
originally planned to use the report from the independent committee of experts cur-
rently conducting an investigation of the fate of wartime assets to decide what to con-
tribute to a humanitarian fund. Alan Cowell, Swiss To Share Control of Holocaust Fund
with Jewish Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1997, at A5 [hereinafter Swiss To Share Control].
25. Fund for Nazis' Victims, supra note 18, at Al. Swiss To Share Control, supra note
24, at AS. The Swiss Government and the World Jewish, Restitution Organization
agreed on an executive body to manage the Humanitarian Fund, to be composed of
four Swiss nominees and three World Jewish Restitution Organization nominees. Id.
26. Fund for Nazis' Victims, supra note 18, at Al. The three largest commercial Swiss
banks, Crhdit Suisse, the Swiss Bank Corporation, and Union Bank of Switzerland, con-
tributed roughly a third each to the Humanitarian Fund. Id. at A12. This announce-
ment came two weeks after the Swiss Government, leading commerical Swiss banks, and
businesses agreed in principle to establish a memorial fund for Holocaust victims. Alan
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the Humanitarian Fund when talks of a boycott by leading U.S.
Jewish organizations threatened to damage Switzerland's already
distressed banking economy, thereby forcing the Swiss banks to
take action.28 These acknowledgments of financial responsibil-
ity, however, are not designed to facilitate the distribution of
dormant accounts belonging to the heirs of victims of the Holo-
caust.
29
This Note examines historical and current attempts to settle
claims on dormant Swiss bank accounts and proposes a mecha-
nism designed to resolve the dispute. Part I provides back-
ground information on the claims, including the relevant Swiss
law, obstacles encountered by earlier claimants, and the Swiss
Government's early resolution attempts. Part I also outlines
frameworks of international arbitral and adjudicatory forums
employed to resolve international disputes. Part II discusses the
attempts of the Swiss banks, Swiss Government, U.S. Congress,
private individuals, and independent organizations to resolve
Cowell, Switzerland and Banks Agree to a Fund for Holocaust Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1997, at A3.
27. See Swiss To Use Gold, supra note 22, at A6 (noting that Swiss National Bank
offered to contribute its share of the funding after private banks had already established
Humanitarian Fund).
28. Funds For Nazis' Victims, supra note 18, at Al. The Swiss economy has stopped
growing for the past five years and the combination of the stagnant economy and a
steadily appreciating Swiss franc has taken a heavy toll on bank customers. William
Hall, Buffeted by Storming Sea of Change, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1996, at 1. In response,
Credit Suisse, one of Switzerland's three largest banks, has closed over one third of its
outlets and shed 3000jobs, about 15% of its domesticworkforce. Id. The other largest
banks, Swiss Bank Corporation, and Union Bank of Switzerland have followed suit. Id.
The publicly proposed merger between Credit Suisse and the Union Bank of Switzer-
land also suggests the banks need to economize. Id.
29. Fund for Nazis' Victims, supra note 18, at Al. Gertrud Erismann, a spokeswoman
for the Union Bank of Switzerland in Zurich speaking on the Humanitarian Fund,
stressed, "the proposed fund would not draw on dormant accounts or prejudice claims
on them." Id. at A12. Israel Singer, Secretary General of the World Jewish Congress,
also acknowledged that payments from the Humanitarian Fund would not prejudice
claims before the Volcker Commission, an independent committee currently oversee-
ing an audit of dormant Swiss bank accounts. Swiss to Share Control, supra note 24, at AS.
Jewish organizations needed reassurance after the Swiss Government's previous offer
on January 7, 1997 to establish a fund "'in favor of Holocaust victims and their de-
scendants'" to be drawn from dormant accounts discovered in Swiss banks dating to
World War II. Swiss Offer To Start Fund, supra note 9, at A6. Leading Jewish organiza-
tions rejected the January 7, 1997 proposal, noting "[t]hey're trying to buy us with
money that's not theirs." Id. The current US$140 million Humanitarian Fund falls shy
of the reported US$250 million offered by Swiss Ambassador Thomas Borer during
talks between the Swiss Government and the World Jewish Congress in late 1996. Swiss
Set To Settle, supra note 8, at 1.
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claims to dormant Swiss bank accounts. Part III argues that the
current mechanisms are inappropriate for handling claims on
dormant Swiss bank accounts and proposes an alternative mech-
anism that is better designed for settling claims based on its abil-
ity to offer final resolution to both claimants and banks. This
Note concludes that the only effective way to settle the dispute
over dormant Swiss bank accounts is to implement this propsed
hybrid forum for the final resolution of claims.
I. CLAIMING DORMANT SWISS BANK ACCOUNTS UNDER
HEIRSHIP RIGHTS AND SETTLING INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES
The Swiss inheritance laws are clear about the procedures
for distributing assets to heirs.30 For descendants of Holocaust
victims looking to claim their inherited bank accounts, the more
formidable obstacles have been the unavailability of requisite
documentation and the Swiss bank secrecy laws. 1 Post World
War II attempts by individuals and by the Swiss Government to
settle claims were not wholly successful.3 2 Traditionally, parties
looking for binding resolution of international disputes have
had the choice of arbitration or adjudication. 3
A. Historical Origins of Conflict
Antisemitic legislation existed in Germany long before
Hitler's appointment as Chancellor of Germany on January 30,
1933.3' By October 1933, six months after Hitler's Government
30. See INTRODUCTION TO Swiss LAw, supra note 13, at 77 (discussing inheritance
requirements set out in Articles 457-459 of Swiss Civil Code).
31. See Historians' Report, supra note 13, pt. II, at 1-2 (providing examples of legal
and administrative obstacles faced by claimants of dormant bank accounts).
32. See id. (noting shortcomings of Swiss Government's attempts to handle heirless
assets); Picard Report, supra note 13, § 8.1, at 21-22 (discussing weaknesses of Switzer-
land's post World War II efforts to return assets to their legal owners).
33. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33(1) (listing arbitration and adjudication as methods
for peaceful settlement of disputes).
34. Lucy S. DAWIDOWIcz, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEwS 56-7 (1975). Heinrich Class,
a leading German anti-semite in the early 1900s and president of Mittlestand, a political
group organized against the industrial urban society and increasing urbanization, in-
spired anti-semitic legislation. Id. at 35, 43. Class authored a book enumerating legal
measures to deprive German Jews of their rights. Id. at 57. Class proposed legislation
that would state:
All public offices, whether national, state, or municipal, salaried or honorary,
are closed to Jews. Jews are not admitted to serve in the army or navy. Jews
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passed the Enabling Act, 5 the National Socialists in Germany
passed laws dismissing and excluding Jews from all positions in
public life, including those in the government, professions, and
all of Germany's social, educational, and cultural institutions.3 6
As a reaction to Hitler's legislation, 37,000 Jews fled Germany in
1933 alone.3 7
In September 1935, Hitler's Government passed the Law for
the Protection of German Blood and German Honor, better
known as the Nuremberg Laws.3" The Nuremberg Laws and re-
lated decrees differentiated between the Jews and Germans le-
gally, politically, and socially and left the Jews outside of the pro-
tection of the state.3 9 By October 1938, the Nazi Government
had dissolved, or was in the process of liquidating, over four
hundred Jewish communities, twenty-five percent of all the Jew-
ish communities in Germany.0 The German invasion of Poland
on September 1, 1939 brought an additional two million Jews
under German rule.41 An additional three million Jews came
under German rule two years later following Germany's attack
on the Soviet Union.42
Upon invading a town or city, the Germans conducted sys-
tematic and deliberate searches for wealth that they could locate
have neither an active nor a passive right to vote. The occupation of lawyer
and teacher is forbidden to them, also the direction of theaters. Newspapers
on which Jews Work must make that known; newspapers that may be called
"German" are not permitted to be owned by Jews or to have Jewish managers
or coworkers. Banks that are not purely personal enterprises are not permit-
ted to have any Jewish directors. In the future rural property may not be
owned by Jews or mortgaged by them. As compensation for the protection
that Jews enjoy as aliens, they must pay double the taxes that Germans pay.
Id.
35. Id. at 51. The Enabling Act provided Hitler's Government with the legal au-
thority to pass legislation even if it conflicted with the Constitution. Id.
36. Id. at 61.
37. Id. at 173.
38. Id. at 66. The Nuremberg Laws aimed to prevent mixed offspring by forbid-
ding marriage between Jews and nationals of German kindred blood and extramarital
relation between the two groups. Id. at 67. Also, the Nuremberg Laws prohibited Jews
from hiring female domestic help under the age of 45 who were of German kindred
blood. Id. The Nuremberg Laws also prohibitedJews from flying the German National
colors. Id.
39. Id. at 68-69.
40. Id. at 172-73.
41. Id. at 197.
42. Id.
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and confiscate.43 The Germans violated the Jewish people and
their belongings by confiscating, plundering, and robbing the
Jews of their businesses, personal gold, and jewelry.' Germans
took Jewish hostages in order to solicit large extortion pay-
ments.45 As a result of these activities, people subjected to Nazi
persecution transferred their assets to neutral countries, like
Switzerland.46
By 1942, Hitler had confined Jewish communities to ghet-
tos, quarters surrounded by walls and barbed wire, where Nazi
soldiers forced them to live. 47 Inside, Jews deprived of freedom
succumbed to hunger, forced labor, and disease.48 In March
1942, German officials put the Final Solution into motion.49
They ordered the liquidation of the ghettos and sent the Jews to
specially constructed concentration camps where German troops
gassed or shot them.5" In total, the Germans killed almost six
million European Jews.51
B. Swiss Law
Switzerland's well-developed inheritance laws clearly define
one's right and capacity to inherit as an heir.52 By law, all rights
43. MARTIN GILBERT, THE HOLOCAUST 468 (1985).
44. DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 34, at 200. "Shops, businesses and factories [were]
taken first, transferred without recompense to local Ethnic Germans or to the German
war machine. Furs,jewellery, radios, even pets [were] taken next." GILBERT, supra note
43, at 468.
45. DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 34, at 200.
46. Israel Singer, Secretary General of the World Jewish Congress, and Chairman
of the World Jewish Restitution Organization, Holocaust Assets, Nazi Gold and the In-
vestigation Into Swiss Banking Practices, Speaker for the New York Women's Bar Associ-
ation and its International Law Committee (Mar. 3, 1997). For example, in 1939, peo-
ple knew Hitler was about to attack Poland, and consequently made 17,000 transfers
between Poland and neutral countries, like Switzerland. Id.
47. DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 34, at 203-07.
48. Id. at 207.
49. Id. at 139. The Final Solution was the systematic attempt to annihilate the
European Jews. Id. It is estimated that in Poland, Germany/Austria, and the Baltic
countries, the Nazis killed ninety percent of the Jewish populations in the Final Solu-
tion. Id. at 403. In total, it is estimated that the Nazis killed sixty-seven percent of the
Jewish population in carrying out the Final Solution. Id.
50. Id. at 140.
51. Id. at 403.
52. See INTRoDucrioN TO Swiss LAw, supra note 13, at 77 (discussing Swiss law gov-
erning inheritance).
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belonging to a decedent pass to the decedent's heirs.53 Banking
law secrecy 54 has its roots in the liberally interpreted principle of
personal privacy. Bank secrecy guards an individual's privacy
right from illegitimate assaults.
5 6
1. Swiss Intestacy Law
In Switzerland, a prerequisite to claiming an inheritance is
the right and capacity to inherit.5 7 Swiss law vests this right in
heirs.58 Under the Swiss inheritance law, for heirs to inherit by
intestate succession, 9 the heirs must establish a parental or mar-
ital tie to the deceased.60 Heirless assets become the property of
the state if the deceased's last domicile was in Switzerland.6 If
the deceased's last domicile was not in Switzerland, other coun-
tries may claim the heirless assets by virtue of their own inheri-
tance laws.62
53. Swiss Civil Code, art. 1 in The Swiss Civil Code: English Version 1 (Ivy Williams
et al. trans., 1987).
54. See Lutz Krauskopf, Comments on Switzerland's Insider Trading, Money Laundering
and Banking Secrecy Laws, 9 ITrr'L TAx & Bus. LAw 277, 293 (1991) (discussing develop-
ment of bank secrecy laws in Switzerland via right to privacy laws).
55. See Hermine Herta Mayer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in Switzer-
land, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 284, 284 (1955) (discussing expansive interpretation of
right to privacy in Switzerland).
56. Werner de Capitani, Banking Secrecy Today, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 57, 68
(1988).
57. See INTRODUCTION TO Swiss LAw, supra note 13, at 77 (discussing inheritance
under Swiss law).
58. Swiss Civil Code, sect. I n.2. The term 'heir' refers to "any person who has a
right to succeed on the death of another to his estate... whether by law or under a
will." Id.
59. See Swiss Civil Code, title XIII (establishing requirements for intestate succes-
sion); INTRODUCTION TO Swiss LAw, supra note 13, at 77 (discussing intestate succes-
sion). Intestate succession occurs when the law designates heirs instead of the de-
ceased. Swiss Civil Code, sect I n.2. Where the heir's right is given to him by law, he is
called a statutory heir. Id.
60. See id. arts. 457-459 (setting forth order of priority for inheritance purposes).
Under Article 457, descendants of the deceased including children, grandchildren, and
great-grandchildren receive priority. Id. art. 457. Under Article 458, the parents of the
deceased and their descendants are next in the line of succession, including siblings,
nieces, and nephews of the deceased. Id. art. 458. Under Article 459, the grandparents
and their descendants including aunts, uncles, and cousins of the deceased are third in
the line of succession. Id. art. 459.
61. Id. art. 466; INTRonucrION TO Swiss LAw, supra note 13, at 79. According to
Article 466 of the Swiss Civil Code on the law of inheritance, "[i]n default of heirs of the
deceased, the inheritance devolves to the Canton of the deceased's last domicile or to
the Commune entitled under the law of the Canton." Swiss Civil Code, art. 466.
62. Picard Report, supra note 13, § 7.3, at 19-20. For example, Hungary relied on
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The rights to an estate vest in an heir or heirs by operation
of law at the death of the decedent,63 and all rights that be-
longed to the decedent pass to the heir or heirs.6 4 Every individ-
ual may inherit as an heir unless he or she is under a legal inca-
pacity to inherit.65 An individual would be under legal incapac-
ity to inherit for unlawfully contributing to a decedent's death or
for unlawfully destroying a will.6 6
2. Swiss Bank Secrecy Law
In Switzerland, a traditionally expansive interpretation of
the principle of personal privacy67 extends to bank secrecy.68
Swiss criminal and civil law, which protect personal privacy, also
protect bank secrecy.69 This protection lasts for the duration of
its own law of inheritance to establish Hungarian claims to assets in Swiss bank ac-
counts. Id. Under the 1945 Hungarian law of inheritance, blood relatives had an un-
restricted legal entitlement to inherit, followed only by the state. Id. The Hungarian
law of inheritance, amended as of April 30, 1946, established Hungarian inheritance
claims of descendants in a direct line from the grandparents and, after that, the state.
Id.
63. Swiss Civil Code, art. 560(1); INTRODUCTION TO Swiss LAw, supra note 13, at 84.
64. Swiss Civil Code, art. 560(2).
65. Id. art 539(1).
66. Id. art. 540(1). Persons considered unworthy to inherit include:
1. [A] person who has intentionally and unlawfully caused or attempted the
death of the deceased;
2. a person who has intentionally and unlawfully made the deceased perma-
nently incapable of making a will or pact;
3. a person who by fraud, force or threats has induced the deceased to make
or revoke a testamentary disposition or prevented him from so doing;
4. a person who has intentionally and unlawfully suppressed or destroyed a
will or pact under circumstances which prevented the testator from re-
making it.
Id.
67. See Mayer, supra note 55, at 287 (noting that right to privacy encompasses intel-
lectual, health, family life, financial affairs and economic privacy of partnerships, as-
sociations, and business secrets). The derivation of bank secrecy in Switzerland reflects
the value the Swiss place on individual liberties. See Michele Moser, Switzerland: New
Exceptions to Bank Secrecy Laws Aimed at Money Laundering and Organized Crime, 27 CASE W.
REs.J. INT'L L. 321, 323 n.18. (1995) (stating that Swiss law guards privacy asjealously as
U.S law guards First Amendment rights).
68. See Krauskopf, supra note 54, at 293 (discussing derivation of bank secrecy laws
in Switzerland from right to privacy laws).
69. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez, RIP to IRP - Money Laundering and Drug Traf-
ficking Controls Score A Knockout Vctoy Over Bank Secrecy, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
235, 240 (1993) (discussing enforcement of Swiss bank secrecy laws); Moser, supra note
67, at 324-26 (discussing sources of Swiss banking law and other financial secrecy).
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the contract between a bank and its customer,7°1 but the secrecy
requirement does not apply in cases where it is subject to abuse
or where foreign nations need aid in criminal investigations.71
a. Origins, Sources, and Duration of Swiss Bank Secrecy
Swiss courts derived a customary rule of professional secrecy
from the principle of personal privacy.72 Personal privacy in
Switzerland encompasses both economic and personal affairs.73
According to the Swiss legal code, financial privacy, which in-
cludes bank secrecy, is inextricably linked to this concept of pri-
vacy. 7 4
The Swiss legal system relies on customs, like bank secrecy,
as a primary source of law in the absence of an applicable legisla-
tive provision. 71 At times, the Swiss legislature may codify cus-
tom to ensure uniform application. 76 Prior to '1934, foreign na-
tions, particularly Nazi Germany, attempted to locate and confis-
cate bank accounts belonging to Jews.77 Accordingly, the
legislature codified bank secrecy 78 in the Swiss Federal Law on
Banks and Savings Banks of November 8, 1934 ("Banking Act of
70. BUSINESS LAW GUIDE, supra note 7, 1 1135, at 354-55.
71. de Capitani, supra note 56, at 68.
72. See Ivy Wi-LuIMAs, THE SOURCES OF LAW IN THE CIVIL CODE 114 (ReMaK Verlag
Zfirich 1976) (1923) (explaining development of professional secrecy from right to pri-
vacy). "Breach of professional secrecy does ... violate a personal right, namely the
right to have one's privacy respected." Id. (quoting Hilfiker v. Morel and Dr. Vonga (J.
des. T., 1919, D.F., 88) (Switz.) where doctor breached professional secrecy and vio-
lated patient's right of privacy by disclosing information to patient's father without pa-
tient's consent). This concept of personal privacy extends from relationships with phy-
sicians and lawyers to include personal financial affairs, including relationships with
bankers. See Krauskopf, supra note 54, at 293 (discussing origin of Swiss banking se-
crecy).
73. See, e.g., Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks of Nov. 8, 1934,
amended on March 18, 1994, art. 47 (Arthur Andersen et al. trans. 1996) [hereinafter
Swiss Banking Act of 1934] (criminalizing disclosure of confidential financial informa-
tion) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); Swiss Civil Code, art. 28 (pro-
viding protection from invasion of privacy).
74. de Capitani, supra note 56, at 58.
75. INTRODUCnON TO Swiss LAw, supra note 13, at 6. Article 1 of the Swiss Civil
Code instructs the judge to apply customary law when a relevant code section is not
available. See Swiss Civil Code, supra note 53, art. 1, at 1 ("[w]here no provision is
applicable, the judge shall decide according to the existing Customary Law . ).
76. INTRODUCTION TO Swiss LAw, supra note 13, at 6-7.
77. Krauskopf, supra note 54, at 293.
78. Id.; INTRODUCTION TO Swiss LAw, supra note 13, at 6-7.
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1934") 79 in order to prevent the Nazis from obtaining informa-
tion which could be used against Swiss citizens. 80
Just as the right to privacy is a fundamental right protected
in both criminal and civil law,8" breaches of bank secrecy are also
punishable in both criminal and civil law.82 Article 47 of the
Banking Act of 1934 punishes bank employees who make unau-
thorized disclosures of banking and secret business information
with a punishment of up to six months in prison or a fine of up
to 50,000 Swiss francs ("sFr").11 Bank employees may disclose
confidential information with either the customer's consent or
permission by a Swiss cantonal or federal authority.84 Article 273
of the Swiss Penal Code, adopted in 1935, also criminalizes the
unauthorized disclosure of secret business information. 85 Under
79. Swiss Banking Act of 1934, supra note 73; Lovett, supra note 14, at 443 n.ll.
80. See Krauskopf, supra note 54, at 293 (discussing origin of Swiss banking se-
crecy).
81. See Code P~nal Suisse, art. 273 (Andre Panchaud 2d ed. 1962) (Switz.) [herein-
after Swiss Penal Code] (criminalizing unauthorized disclosure of business secrets);
Swiss Civil Code, supra note 53, art. 28 (imposing tort liability); 1 Swiss Code of
Obligations, art. 97 (Swiss-American Chambers of Commerce trans., 3d ed. 1995) (im-
posing contract liability); Swiss Banking Act of 1934, supra note 73, art. 47 (criminaliz-
ing unauthorized financial disclosures).
82. See Moser, supra note 67, at 324-26 (discussing sources of Swiss banking se-
crecy); Hernandez, supra note 69, at 240 (discussing sources of enforcement of Swiss
bank secrecy laws).
83. Swiss Banking Act of 1934, supra note 73, art. 47. The text of Article 47 reads:
1. Persons who disclose confidential information entrusted to them in their
capacity as member of the bank's governing bodies, employee, mandatory,
liquidator or commissioner of a bank, as observer of the Swiss Banking
Commission, as a member of the bank's governing bodies or employee of
a bank audit firm, or which has come to their attention in such capacity;
and who seek to induce others to violate professional secrecy, will be pe-
nalized with imprisonment of up to six months or a fine of up to [sFr]
50000.
2. Offenses committed because of negligence will be penalized by a fine of
up to [sFr] 30000.
3. Violation of professional secrecy is punishable even after termination of
the governmental or private employment relationship or the professional
appointment.
4. Federal and cantonal regulations governing the duty to testify and to fur-
nish the authorities with information are to be observed.
Id.
84. Id.
85. Swiss Penal Code, art. 273. Tided "Economic Information in the Interest of a
Foreign Country," Article 273 reads:
Any person who seeks to discover a manufacturing or business secret with a
view to making it available to a foreign official or private organization or to a
foreign private enterprise or to the agents thereof or any person who makes
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Swiss law, business secrets or business information include any
data of economic life.86 Thus, banking information is a business
secret within the meaning of Article 273 and any privacy viola-
tions are criminal acts.87
Bank employees who violate a client's confidence are sub-
ject to civil liability under tort and contract theories.8" Swiss tort
law stems from an individual's right to privacy,89 which includes
a right to secrecy in financial affairs.90 Article 28 of the Swiss
Civil Code grants an injured person the right to seek protection
from ajudge.91 The remedy for a wrongful injury in tort, such as
an invasion of financial privacy, is monetary damages or other
judicially-imposed reparations.92
Liability under contract theory stems from the agency rela-
available a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign official or private
enterprise or to the agents thereof shall be punished by imprisonment or in
serious cases to 'reclusion.' The judge may, in addition, impose a fine.
Krauskopf, supra note 54, at 295 (providing unofficial english translation of Article
273). Article 273 applies on the theory that disclosure of domestic information might
harm Switzerland economically. See Moser, supra note 67, at 324 (discussing derivation
of Swiss banking and other financial secrecy).
86. See Krauskopf, supra note 54, 300 n.35 (citing Judgment of Nov. 20, 1939,
Bundesgericht, Switz., 65 BGE I 330 (Admn. & Constitutional case) and defining eco-
nomic life to include person's private relations and transactions concerning property
and income). Swiss law recognizes a private personality separate from the economic
personality. See Swiss Civil Code, arts. 11 et seq (laying out part I on law of persons
under which Title I governs natural persons and Title II governs corporate bodies);
Mayer, supra note 55, at 287 (explaining source of Swiss banking secret). The Swiss
Civil Code ascribes the status of a person to both personalities. See Swiss Civil Code, art.
11 ("[a]ny person can be the subject of rights."); id., art. 52, at 18 ("[i]ncorporated
associations and those foundations which have a specific object and an independent
existence acquire the status of a person by registration in the commercial register.").
87. Krauskopf, supra note 54, at 295-96.
88. Id. at 296.
89. See Swiss Code of Obligations, art. 49 (setting forth liability in tort for injuring
another person's individual inherent rights).
90. See Hernandez, supra note 69, at 240-41 (noting individual's right to privacy
includes intellectual, incorporeal existence, health, family life, and financial affairs).
91. Swiss Civil Code, art. 28. Article 28 reads in part, "[w]here anyone is injured in
his person by an illegal act, he can apply to the judge for his protection from any per-
son who takes an active part in effecting the injury." Id.
92. See Swiss Code of Obligations, arts. 41, 49. Under Article 41, "[w]hoever un-
lawfully causes damage to another, whether willfully or negligently, shall be liable for
damages.. .. " Id. art. 41(1). Under Article 49:
1. Where individual inherent rights are injured, the damaged person may,
where there is fault, claim compensation for damage sustained and, where
the particular seriousness of the injury and of the fault justify it and has
not been compensated otherwise, claim payment of a sum of money as
reparations.
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tionship9 3 that arises between a bank and a customer. 94 An
agent has a duty of secrecy and may not exploit or disclose
knowledge obtained in the course of his agency relationship.95
Because secrecy is part of any contract with a bank customer,
under Article 97 of the Code of Obligations which governs
agency relationships, any breach of secrecy amounts to non-per-
formance of that obligation and results in a breach of contract.9 6
Pursuant to a contract between a Swiss bank and its cus-
tomer, the bank must maintain confidentiality for the duration
of the contractual relationship.9 7 Confidential information in-
cludes a customer's financial status, relationships with other
banks and third parties, and any other information the customer
entrusted to the agent during the course of his dealings.98 Swit-
zerland does not have escheat laws requiring the transfer of dor-
mant accounts to the state, so Swiss banks maintain dormant ac-
counts indefinitely.99 An account that lies dormant, therefore,
remains protected against unauthorized access,100 and a cus-
tomer's claims are not subject to a statute of limitations.10 '
2. In lieu of, or in addition to, this payment, the judge may also award other
kinds of reparations.
Id. art. 49.
93. Id. art. 418a(1). Article 418a of the Swiss Code of Obligations defines an agent
as "a person who obligates himself to act on a continuous basis as an intermediary on
behalf of one or several principals in business transactions . . . or to conclude such
transactions in their name and for their account without being in an employment rela-
tionship with such principals. . . ." Id.
94. Krauskopf, supra note 54, at 296.
95. See Swiss Code of Obligations, art. 418d(l). Article 418d(1) reads, "[t]he agent
may not exploit or inform others of business secrets ... with which he has been en-
trusted, or of which he has obtained knowledge in the course of his agency relationship,
including the use or disclosure even after termination of the contract . . . ." Id.
96. See id. art. 97 (providing "[i]f the performance of an obligation can not at all
or not duly be effected, the obligor shall compensate ... for the damage arising there-
from.. ").
97. BUSINESS LAW GuIDE, supra note 7, 1135, at 355.
98. Id. 1136, at 355.
99. See Senate Hearings, supra note 19 (setting forth statement of Hans J. Baer,
member, Executive Board of Swiss Bankers Association). "The bank, however, reserves
the right of termination or compensation if the bank's fee to be charged to the cus-
tomer or his or her heirs is no longer covered." Global Survey, supra note 17, at 136.
100. See Global Survey, supra note 17, at 136 (noting that banks label accounts as
dormant when there is no movement in account after ten years and customer has not
been in touch with 'bank).
101. See Swiss Code of Obligations, arts. 127, 130. In Switzerland, the statute of
limitations for claims is generally ten years. Id. art. 127. The limitation period starts to
run when an obligation becomes due. Id. art. 130(1). Swiss banks maintain dormant
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b. Exceptions to Swiss Bank Secrecy
The Swiss legislature codified bank secrecy to protect pri-
vacy from illegitimate assaults and not to protect illegal behavior
from legitimate investigation. 112 Banks self-regulate against po-
tential abuse of bank secrecy.1 0 3 Bank secrecy does not apply to
all domestic civil and criminal litigation. 104 In litigation abroad,
however, a bank has an absolute duty to preserve bank se-
crecy.105 The Swiss Government has agreed in certain circum-
stances to lift the absolute secrecy which would otherwise hinder
a foreign investigation. 106
The Swiss Government enacted the Federal Act on Interna-
tional Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters on March 20, 1981,
effective January 1, 1983, to aid foreign nations in criminal inves-
tigations.10 7 Pursuant to this Act, Swiss authorities will grant ju-
dicial assistance to foreign states, conditional on the requesting
states' willingness to reciprocate in a comparable situation.10 8
accounts indefinitely, however, so the limitation period never starts to run. See Global
Sumey, supra note 17, at 136 (discussing bank maintenance of dormant accounts).
102. de Capitani, supra note 56, at 68.
103. See Agreement on the Swiss Banks Code of Conduct With Regard to the Exer-
cise of Due Diligence, July 1, 1992, bewteen the Swiss Bankers Association and the Sig-
natory Banks [hereinafter Due Dilengence Convention] (safeguarding against abuse of
bank secrecy with respect to accepting of deposits) (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal); BUSINESS LAw GUIDE, supra note 7, 1 1142, at 361-62 (discussing
Due Diligence Convention). The Convention states that banks must clearly identify the
parties with whom they are contracting, along with beneficial owners of funds. Due
Diligence Convention, supra, art. 1, pmbl., at 3. The Swiss National Bank was a party to
earlier versions of the Due Diligence Convention. BUSINESS LAw GUIDE, supra note 7,
1142, at 361.
104. See, e.g., Swiss Banking Act of 1934, supra note 73, art. 47(4) (subordinating
bank secrecy to federal and cantonal regulations governing duty to testify); BusINEss
LAw GUIDE, supra note 7, 1138, at 356-58 (discussing bank secrecy in civil and criminal
proceedings).
105. BUSINESS LAw GUIDE, supra note 7, 1138(1)(c), at 357.
106. See Moser, supra note 67, at 332-34 (discussing international pressure to relax
Swiss banking secrecy laws).
107. Federal Act on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 20,
1981 (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
108. Id., art. 8; BUSINESS LAw GUIDE, supra note 7, 1821(3), at 518. Demonstra-
tive of this, in April 1986, the new Philippine Government requested international
assistance from the Swiss authorities to prevent former Philippine President Ferdinand
Marcos from removing money from Switzerland that he embezzled and placed in Swiss
bank accounts. PieterJ. Hoets & Sara G. Zwait, Swiss Bank Secrecy and the Marcos Affair, 9
N.Y.L. ScH.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 75, 96 (1988). The new Philippine Government guaran-
teed reciprocity. Id. at 97. Assets in Switzerland belonging to Marcos remained frozen
pursuant to the request for assistance. Id. at 97-98.
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Switzerland has also entered into treaties with foreign nations on
international assistance in criminal matters."0 9 The U.S. Govern-
ment and the Swiss Government entered into such a treaty, on
January 23, 1977.110 The U.S.-Swiss Treaty on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters grants the U.S. access to protected bank
records if a crime under investigation is also a crime in Switzer-
land."1 '
C. Unsuccessful Attempts to Claim Accounts
In post World War II Switzerland, people claiming estates
109. See BUSINEss LAw GUIDE, supra note 7, 1 1819, at 515-16 (listing 32 countries
with which Switzerland has signed assistance treaties).
110. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 23, 1977, U.S.-Switzerland, 27
U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Treaty on Mutual Assistance]. U.S. courts have been able to
compel protected information without relying on the Treaty on Mutual Assistance. See,
e.g., Securities Exchange Commission v. Banco Della Svizzera Italiana ("BSI"), 92 F.R.D.
111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In BSI, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
tried unsuccessfully to obtain the identities of those involved in an insider trading
scheme along with defendant, BSI, a Swiss bank. Id. at 113. Granting the SEC's mo-
tion, the United States District Court, for the Southern District of New York, entered an
order requiring BSI to disclose the identities, to be followed by severe sanctions if BSI
failed to comply. Id. The sanctions included a US$50,000 per day fine and a ban from
trading in the United States. Hoets & Zwart, supra note 108, at 78 n.13. BSI obtained a
waiver of confidentiality from the client and reported to the court. BSI, 92 F.R.D. at
113.
In deciding whether to compel discovery, U.S. courts have developed a balancing
test to weigh the third party's interests in disclosure with the Swiss bank's secrecy obliga-
tion. See, e.g., Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (deciding whether to compel production of documents by Swiss bank defend-
ant). The court in Minpeco derived the test from section 40 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Foreign Relations, on Limitations on Exercise of EnforcementJurisdiction. Id.
at 522. The court stated:
[T]he principal factors to consider in deciding this motion to compel are (1)
the competing interests of the nations whose laws are in conflict, (2) the hard-
ship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought, (3)
the importance to the litigation of the information and documents requested,
and (4) the good faith of the party resisting discovery.
Id. at 523.
111. Treaty on Mutual Assistance, supra note 110, art. 10(2), at 2036. Insider trad-
ing first became a criminal offense in Switzerland onJuly 1, 1988. BusiNEss LAw GUIDE,
supra note 7, 1 1140, at 359. Article 161 of the Swiss Penal Code governs insider trad-
ing, punishing "the misuse of privileged confidential information ... in stock exchange
transactions in order to realise a profit or prevent a loss." See id. (providing unofficial
translation of Article 161 of Swiss Penal Code). In 1986, however, U.S. authorities were
able to lift Swiss bank secrecy in the insider trading case against Dennis Levine, two
years before insider trading was illegal under Swiss law. See 18 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) at 889 (June 20, 1986).
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belonging to Nazi victims faced a number of problems.' 12
Claimants not in possession of either the certificate of entitle-
ment to inherit1 13 or requisite bank documents had difficulty re-
covering their inheritances.14 Possession of those documents
did not guarantee success, however, as Swiss legal and adminis-
trative procedures hindered heirs' recovery of their inheri-
tances. 115 In one account, the Justice Division of the Swiss Fed-
eral Department of Justice and Police demanded that an heir
have her notarized death certificate and entitlement to inherit
authenticated by a foreign state.1 16 In another case, a Swiss bank
legally had stopped paying interest on a deposit balance when
contact with the client lapsed and had absorbed the balance af-
ter the expiration of a limitation period." 7
D. Early Resolution Attempts
During World War II, people chose to deposit valuable as-
sets and vast sums of money into Switzerland's custody because
of Switzerland's neutrality and bank secrecy laws. 1 ' By the end
of World War II, Switzerland had accumulated assets belonging
112. See Historians' Report, supra note 13, pt. III, at 1 (providing examples of ob-
stacles faced by claimants).
113. See id. pt. 111(3), at 4-5 (discussing poorly-established precedent for declaring
foreign citizens as missing for inheritance purposes).
114. See id. pt. 111(2), at 3-4 (illustrating Swiss authorities' poor assistance in locat-
ing bank accounts).
115. See id. pt. III, at 1-2 (discussing legal and administrative difficulties encoun-
tered by claimants).
116. See id. pt. III(1), at 2-3 (discussing Reginek case which called into question
foreign states' willingness to authenticate documents).
117. See id. pt. 111(5), at 6-8 (noting that banking laws at that time did not protect
at least 77 creditors who unknowingly forfeited their accounts).
118. See Barry Meier, The New Old News of Nazi Loot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, at 1
(commenting on unclaimed deposits left in Swiss banks after World War II). Jewish
organizations estimate that almost US$7 billion remains in unclaimed accounts.
Drozdiak, supra note 7, at 42. A significant part of that money may be allocable to
unpaid life insurance contracts. Polity of Deceit, supra note 7, at 18. The Swiss Barkers
Association estimates the value of unclaimed accounts to be in the tens of millions of
dollars. Daly, supra note 7, at 2-3.
Switzerland's role as a neutral country amidst warring European countries spans
from its 16th Century position in the conflict between France and Austria through
World War II to the present. Hernandez, supra note 69, at 241. The American
Safehaven program during World War II was aimed directly at preventing Nazis from
secreting wealth to neutral countries like Switzerland. Meier, supra, at 1. Current alle-
gations against Switzerland call this neutrality into question. Thomas L. Friedman, The
Neutrality Myth, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1997, at A23. Allegations include Switzerland's role
in storing Nazi gold, warehousing looted property taken by the Nazis, denying Jewish
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to German nationals,11 9 assets looted from conquered coun-
tries,1 20 and bank accounts belonging to victims of the Holocaust
or their heirs. 2 1 Following World War II, the Swiss Government
attempted to settle the handling of German assets in Switzerland
with the Washington Agreement, 12 2 and to settle the issue of
heirless assets with the Federal Resolution of December 20,
1962. 123
1. The Washington Agreement
The Washington Agreement 24 was the Swiss Government's
first attempt to settle the handling of German assets in Swiss
banks.' 25 In total, the Swiss Government surrendered sFr 375
refugees entry into Switzerland, and hindering the effort of Holocaust survivors track-
ing down family assets. Id.
119. See Dr. L. von Castelmur, The Washington Agreement of 1946 and relations between
Switzerland and the Allies after the Second World War (1992) (discussing liquidation of assets
in Switzerland belonging to German nationals pursuant to Washington Agreement)
(visited Mar. 2, 1996) <http://www.Swissemb.org.nago.htm> (also on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal).
120. See House Hearings, supra note 2. Edgar Bronfman, chairman of the World
Jewish Congress, testified that a declassified U.S. intelligence secret telegram, sent on
December 4, 1945, stated that the Legation had uncovered:
(a) the German Reichsbank maintained an important depot of gold in the
Swiss National Bank throughout the war;
(b) the major part of all German gold shipments abroad during the war were
destined for the Swiss National Bank;
(c) approximately [US]$123,000,000 worth of the Belgian gold stolen by the
Germans in France was, after remelting, sent to the Swiss National Bank;
and
(d) part of the gold looted by Germany during the war was sent to the Bank
for International Settlements.
Id. (testimony of Edgar Bronfman, chairman, World Jewish Congress).
121. See Historians' Report, supra note 13, pt. I(1), at 3. A Swiss Government at-
tempt to have all unclaimed accounts registered, which lasted from 1963 until 1974,
yielded sFr 9,989,897 million. See id. at 5 (discussing Federal Resolution that estab-
lished registration authority for unclaimed assets). A more recent audit of dormant
Swiss bank accounts opened before 1945 yielded an additional US$32 million that
might'belong to Holocaust victims. Daly, supra note 7, at 2-3.
122. See Castelmur, supra note 119 (discussing history, content, and implementa-
tion of Washington Agreement).
123. Federal Resolution on the Assets in Switzerland of Foreigners or Stateless Per-
sons who have been Victims of Racial Religious and Political Persecution, Dec. 20, 1962
[hereinafter Swiss Federal Resolution] (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal).
124. Multilateral Liquidation of German Property in Switzerland, May 25, 1946, 13
U.S.T. 1118 [hereinafter Washington Agreement]; Multilateral Liquidation of German
Property in Switzerland, Aug. 28, 1952, 13 U.S.T. 1131.
125. Castelmur, supra note 119, at 3. Parties at the Potsdam Conference of August
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million, the equivalent of US$90 million at that time.126 The
two-part agreement, signed by England, France, the United
States (the "Allies"), and Switzerland, held Switzerland primarily
responsible for tracking down assets in Switzerland belonging to
German nationals who were living in Germany and liquidating
those assets. 127 Switzerland was to deliver half of the proceeds to
the Allies and to keep the other half. 2 1
The Washington Agreement mandated that the Allies and
the Swiss Government each raise one half of the money neces-
sary to compensate German nationals for their liquidated as-
sets. 129 The Washington Agreement also required the Swiss Gov-
ernment to pay sFr 250 million to the Allies in settlement of the
gold acquired from Germany.13 0 In the context of the Washing-
ton Agreement, the Swiss Government agreed to consider the
requested transfer of heirless assets directly to the Allied govern-
ments for the benefit of various refugee organizations.13 1 In ex-
change for the Swiss Government's cooperation and its implicit
admission of guilt, the Allies renounced all claims against the
Swiss Government and the Swiss National Bank relating to the
gold acquired by Switzerland from Germany during World War
11.132
1945 apportioned German assets between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Id.
The Potsdam Conference entitled the Western Allies, including the United States, Eng-
land, and France, to German assets in the countries of Western Europe, including Swit-
zerland. Id. The Washington Agreement handled the liquidation of those assets. Id.
126. Daly, supra note 7, at 2-3.
127. Washington Agreement, supra note 124, art. I, at 1118.
128. Id. art. II, at 1120. The Allies viewed the liquidated assets as reparations and
initially demanded that the Allies receive all of the proceeds of the liquidated assets.
Castelmur, supra note 119, pt. 3, at 4.
129. Washington Agreement, supra note 124, art. 1(3), at 1118; id. annex, arts. I-II,
at 1120-1122.
130. Id. art 11(2), at 1120. Since the end of World War II, people have questioned
the source of Nazi Gold. Vogler, supra note 5, at 1.
Between 1939 and 1945 the [Swiss] National Bank acquired large quantities of
gold from the German Reichsbank. It was not so much the magnitude of
these transactions that prompted criticism -mainly from the Allies - but more
the suspicion . . . that some of the German gold came from Nazi-occupied
territories and had been requisitioned by the Reichsbank in gross violation of
international law.
Id.
131. Picard Report, supra note 13, § 1.3, at 4. The Washington Agreement defined
"heirless assets" to include all assets for which the rightful owners are not known,
namely those belonging to Nazi victims who had died without heirs. Id. at 2,4.
132. Washington Agreement, supra note 124, art. 11(2), at 1120. The United States
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2. Federal Resolution of December 20, 1962
In 1957, Swiss Federal Councillor Harold Huber introduced
a motion in the Swiss parliament demanding that the Swiss Gov-
ernment address the problem of heirless assets.1 33 After consid-
erable debate, the Swiss Government passed the Federal Resolu-
tion of December 20, 1962 (the "Resolution") to safeguard heir-
less assets for their legal owners.1 34 The Resolution established
procedures for declaring persons missing and presumed dead,
determining their heirs, and transferring heirless assets to a fund
(the "Unclaimed Assets Fund").13
The Resolution applied exclusively to assets of non-Swiss
persons who had been victims of persecution on racial, religious,
or political grounds, and who had perished prior to May 9, 1945,
the end of World War II in Europe.136 By law, the Resolution
also unfroze Swiss assets pursuant to the Washington Agreement. Id., art. IV(l) at 1124.
By 1948, the United States had freed sFr 4.3 billion belonging to Switzerland that the
United States had frozen during World War II. Picard Report, supra note 13, at 3.
133. Picard Report, supra note 13, § 4.5, at 10. Federal Councillor Harold Huber's
motion demanded that the Government present parliament with a "report and a mo-
tion to introduce special regulations providing for the compulsory registration of heir-
less assets, establish a simplified procedure for seeking asset owners or their heirs and
for declaring persons missing and presumed dead, and for the allocation of heirless
assets to funds for humanitarian purposes." Id.
134. Federal Resolution, supra note 123; Picard Report, supra note 13, § 6, at 15.
The Swiss Government directed the aims of the Federal Resolution to overcome cum-
bersome laws that existed at the time. Picard Report, supra note 13, § 4.2.2, at 7-8.
135. Picard Report, supra note 13, § 4.6, at 12-13. Swiss civil law remained the
legal basis for identifying claimants entitled to inherit. Id., § 6.1, at 15. With respect to
safeguarding heirless assets for their legal owners, the laws at the time awarded owner-
ship to the holder after the statute of limitations had lapsed. Id., § 6.4, at 16. If a law
were passed requiring assets to be turned over without giving any attention to this issue,
the efforts of the government would be greatly undermined by private holders waiting
out the time. Id.
136. Federal Resolution, supra note 123, art. 1; Picard Report, supra note 13, § 6.1,
at 14. Article 1 states:
(1) Assets of any type located in Switzerland, whose last known owners are
foreign nationals or stateless persons about whom no reliable informa-
tion has been received since the May 9, 1945 and who are known or
presumed to have fallen victim to racial, religious or political persecu-
tion, shall within six months from the date on which this resolution
comes into force, be registered with an authority to be determined by
the Federal Council of Ministers (registration authority) with notifica-
tion of all changes to the assets that have taken place since the disappear-
ance of their owner or his or her absence without information as to his
or her whereabouts.
(2) Safe deposit boxes which may contain notifiable assets or papers serving
to establish the existence and state of these assets shall be opened.
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required all persons, financial institutions, and public authori-
ties to turn over any belongings that they suspected to be within
the Resolution's coverage.1 37 The Resolution lifted the banks'
secrecy obligation in order to facilitate the search for assets, but
maintained the secrecy obligation for the registration authori-
ties. 138 A registration authority (the "Claims Registry") set up in
the Swiss Ministry of Justice and Police for the cataloging of as-
sets of missing foreigners, carried out both the administrative
and legal measures outlined in the Resolution.13 9 In response to
countries who were claiming heirless assets in Switzerland by vir-
tue of their own inheritance laws,"4 the Resolution directed that
Federal Resolution, supra note 123, art. 1.
137. Federal Resolution, supra note 123, art. 4. Article 4 states:
(1) If there be any doubt over an obligation to register, the case must be
presented to the registration authority for a decision.
(2) A claim which has lapsed shall be regarded as frozen if the creditor was
unable to assert his claim in good time due to force majeure, especially
persecution on racial, religious or political grounds.
Id.
138. Federal Resolution, supra note 123, art. 7; see supra note 83 and accompany-
ing text (discussing bank secrecy obligation). Article 7 states:
(1) The obligation to report to the registration authority and to provide in-
formation takes precedence over any obligation to secrecy, in particular
of banks, insurance companies, fiduciary companies, lawyers, notaries
and legal advisors.
(2) The registration authority, the delegate administrator and the guardian-
ship authorities may give information about the circumstances of the
missing owners only to their legal successors and their authorized repre-
sentatives. Private individuals may for special reasons be given summary
information about the existence of assets, if these private individuals are
able to prove that they have a credible claim to inheritance.
Federal Resolution, supra note 123, art. 7.
139. Picard Report, supra note 13, § 6.2, at 15. The administrative measures
started with the initial registration by the custodian holding assets. Id. The Claims
Registry then checked claimants' applications and corresponded with other offices or
authorities involved, including diplomatic representatives abroad. Id. The Claims Reg-
istry handled appeals, considered instituting criminal proceedings based on violations
of law, and dealt with the press. Id. The legal measures the Resolution anticipated also
followed the full progression of events, starting with tracing heirs, issuing public no-
tices, and making inquires of custodians and administrators. Id. The Claims Registry
then established delegate administrators, initiated procedures for dealing with missing
persons presumed dead, and instituted inheritance procedures. Id. These procedures
included opening bank vaults and closed safe deposit boxes and making an inventory of
the contents, ordering registration of assets, handing over inheritances, and transfer-
ring heirless assets to a fund whose purpose the Government would determine later.
Id.
140. Id. § 7.3, at 20. Demonstrative of this, Hungary tried to claim heirless assets
1330 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1306
authorities use Swiss domestic law to implement the Resolution's
provisions unless an international treaty provided otherwise. 41
The Resolution's drafters were concerned because heirless assets
would then go to those countries responsible for the persecution
as most of the owners of the heirless assets were foreigners who
had lived and presumably died abroad. 42
In the ten years following the enactment of the Resolution,
Swiss banks, insurance companies, public authorities, and pri-
vate individuals registered almost sFr 10 million. 43 The rightful
owners received three quarters of the money recovered. 144 The
final quarter financed the Unclaimed Assets Fund, from which
two-thirds went to the Swiss Jewish Communities Association,1 4
5
and one-third to the Swiss Refugee Aid Society.1 46
by virtue of the 1945 Hungarian law of inheritance under which blood relatives had an
unrestricted legal entitlement to inherit, followed only by the State. Id. Hungary also
relied on its inheritance law, amended as of April 30, 1946, whereby descendants in a
direct line from the grandparents were entitled to inherit, and after that the State. Id.
141. Federal Resolution, supra note 123, art. 15. Article 15 states, "[u]nless inter-
national treaties provide otherwise, Swiss domestic law shall be applied in the imple-
mentation of this Federal Resolution." Id. "Article 15 [of the Resolution] was designed
to prevent states that had once been occupied by German troops, and where a commu-
nist regime had later taken power, from seizing these assets under their own law." Pic-
ard Report, supra note 13, § 4.5, at 12.
142. Picard Report, supra note 13, § 4.5, at 12.
143. Id. § 4.1, at 7. The Swiss legislature enacted the Resolution on September 1,
1963 which remained in force until August 31, 1974. Id. § 6, at 14. In today's U.S.
dollars, the amount registered would be about US$30 million. Stewart Ain, N.Y. Refutes
Swiss Money Claim, JEWISH WEEK, Oct. 25, 1996, at 1, 22.
144. Picard Report, supra note 13, § 8.2, at 22. The General Custodial Trustee, Dr.
jur Heinz Hdberlin, responsible for locating rightful owners of unclaimed assets, found
the greatest number of rightful owners in the United States -nd Israel. Historians'
Report, supra note 13, pt. III(3) (d), at 21.
Between 1933 and 1939, 155,000 Jews fled to the United States, which accounted
for almost 35% of the total number of Jews who migrated from Europe at that time.
HILBERG, supra note 15, at 717. Of the remainingJews, 70,000 left for Palestine, 130,000
for countries out of German reach, and the final 10,000 arrived in countries eventually
taken over by Germany. Id. Between July 1947 and December 1951, an additional
72,000Jewish refugees arrived in the United States. Id. at 736. This number represents
almost 29% of the 250,000 refugees in total. Id. As for the other Jewish refugees,
142,000 left for Palestine, 16,000 for Canada, 8000 for Belgium, 2000 for France, and
10,000 for other countries. Id.
145. Picard Report, supra note 13, § 8.2, at 22. The Swiss Jewish Communities As-
sociation is a subsidiary of the Swiss Jewish Communities Association for Welfare and
Aid to Refugees. Id. § 2, at 4.
146. Id. § 8.2, at 22. The Swiss Refugee Aid Society is a humanitarian organization
that followed efforts made in accordance with the Washington Agreement to put heir-
less assets to social uses. Id. § 2, at 4. Also, the Swiss Refugee Aid Society provided
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Critics of the Resolution note that enforcement of the reso-
lution was minimal 4 7 and lessened considerably in the late
1960s after the death of the head of the Registration authority
left the successor to single-handedly carry out the job of register-
ing reported assets and searching for rightful owners.1 4 The
Swiss Bankers Association's early characterization of the Resolu-
tion's lifting of banking secrecy laws as unnecessary also affected
enforcement. 149 Playing on the Swiss Bankers Association's ob-
jections, the Swiss press heightened concern of foreign interven-
tion in Swiss policy which derogated the public's confidence in
the Resolution's procedures. 150
Critics also note problems with the Resolution's implemen-
tation that effectively undermined the effort to register all un-
claimed assets in Switzerland belonging to non-Swiss persons."'
The Claims Registry strictly defined the term victim so that de-
positors of unclaimed assets who died a natural death from hun-
ger or inadequate medical care, resulting from their persecu-
tion, did not qualify as victims of persecution and fell outside the
scope of the Resolution.15 The Ministry of Justice and Police
deemed accounts containing less than sFr 500, and after 1970,
less than sFr 1000, to be trivial and ordered guardians to liqui-
date and transfer such accounts into the Unclaimed Assets
Fund.155 Furthermore, the banks and the Claims Registry dis-
money to Swiss Jews who the Swiss Government forced to bear the costs of supporting
Jewish refugees. Id.
147. Historians' Report, supra note 13, pt. 111(3), at 11. A retrospective look at the
enforcement of the Resolution uncovered that the "Claims Registry employed no in-
spections, audits, penalties, or other means of control to ensure that all assets managers
complied with the duty to register." Id.
148. Picard Report, supra note 13, § 6.2, at 15. The Registration authority never
issued a final report as a result of the change of control. Id.
149. Id. § 4.4, at 8. The Swiss Bankers Association "did not see any necessity for
either special measures on the safeguarding of the assets or for compulsory registra-
tion," as "[sluch measures would contribute an unacceptable derogation of banking
and professional secrecy." Id.
150. Id. § 5.3, at 14. The press picked up the anti-resolution sentiment and widely
criticized the way "that constitutional principles [had] given way to foreign policy con-
sideration," and that "every breach of banking secrecy [would] be duly exploited
abroad." Id. Supporters of the Resolution described it as the "only practicable way
Switzerland could avoid becoming notorious as a country that had enriched itself with
the assets of Jewish victims of Nazism." Id.
151. Historians' Report, supra note 13, pt. III, at 1.
152. Id. pt. III(3)(c), at 20.
153. Id. pt. I1I(3)(d), at 21; id. pt. I1I(3)(e), at 23.
1997] 1331
1332 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1306
agreed about the fate of doubtful cases for which the banks re-
mained liable."'
E. Forums for Binding Resolution of International Disputes
Parties looking for binding resolution of international dis-
putes have the choice of arbitration or adjudication.'55 The use
of these settlement mechanisms varies depending on the parties
involved and the nature of the dispute. 156 Arbitration is an ap-
propriate mechanism for the resolution of disputes when parties
desire the responsibility for appointing the arbitrator and choos-
ing the substantive law the arbitrator will apply in the resolution
of the conflict.'57 Parties relying on an adjudication by a court,
on the other hand, do not have the same decision-making
power, but instead benefit from the predictability of the rules of
procedure and evidence which govern adjudication.'58
1. Arbitration
Parties seeking settlement through arbitration must choose
between ad hoc and institutionalized arbitration.159 Parties de-
154. Id. pt. III(3)(c), at 20. According to Union Bank of Switzerland, doubtful
cases resulted from residence behind the Iron Curtain, a lack of information about
residence and nationality, and uncertainty about the Jewish origin of the account
holder's name. Id. Demonstrative of this was Union Bank of Switzerland's petition to
exclude cases involving the Iron Curtain and uncertainty about the Jewishness of the
account holder's name from coming under the Resolution. Id.
155. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33(1) (listing methods for peaceful settlement of dis-
putes); BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 220 (Frederick M. Hartmann
ed., 1951) (naming adjudication and arbitration as exclusive methods for legal settle-
ment of international disputes). Arbitration is a process of dispute resolution where a
neutral third party, the arbitrator, renders a binding decision after hearing both par-
ties' arguments. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990). Adjudication is the legal
process of resolving a dispute in which a court proceeding yields a formaljudgment. Id.
at 42. Parties to disputes sometimes use arbitration as an alternative to adjudication in
order to avoid the formalities, delay, and expense of ordinary litigation. Id. at 105.
156. See MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 3 (1993) (discussing mechanisms
for settlement of international disputes).
157. Id. at 9. Under the Treaty for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, for ex-
ample, the United States and Switzerland agreed to submit to an arbitral tribunal any
"difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of [the] Treaty."
See Treaty on Mutual Assistance, supra note 110, art. 39(2), at 2059. The arbitral tribu-
nal would consist of three members, with each state appointing one arbitrator who is a
national of that state. Id. The two arbitrators together would nominate a chairman
who is a national and resident of a third state. Id.
158. HIRSCH, supra note 156, at 9.
159. Id. at 12.
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siring more control over the design can establish by agreement
an ad hoc arbitration such as an international claims tribunal,
which governs states' claims and renders awards on some or all
of those claims.16 ' Demonstrative of this is the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal ("Iran-U.S. Tribunal" or "Tribunal")."'6 Parties with
unequal power, or those involved in a dispute of a specialized
nature, may instead be partial to the rules of an established arbi-
tral institution such as the International Centre for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes ("ICSID").I6
a. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Iran and the United States established the Iran-U.S. Tribu-
nal to hear complaints about each nation's expropriation of the
other's foreign investments. 163 The benefit of ad hoc tribunals,
as demonstrated by the Iran-U.S. Tribunal, is the control the or-
ganizing parties have over the design and the proceeding of the
tribunal.1 64 Nations can only be expected to participate in bind-
ing resolution when they have had input into how those deci-
sions are made. 165 This includes determining how arbitrators
are chosen, the choice of substantive law by the arbitrators, and
the enforcement of decisions. 166
i. Role of the Iran-U.S. Tribunal
Iran and the United States established the Iran-U.S. Tribu-
nal pursuant to two separate agreements, the General Declara-
tion 1 6 7 and the Claims Settlement Declaration.16 8 Iran and the
160. Id. at 11, 12;-DavidJ. Bederman, The Glorious Past and Uncertain Future of Inter-
national Claims Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 161
(Mark W. Janis ed., 1992). Parties establish international claims tribunals by agree-
ment. Id. While negotiating the agreement, parties determine the number of arbitra-
tors, the law the arbitrators will apply, and the mechanism for enforcing decisions.
HIRScH, supra note 156, at 11.
161. Mark W. Janis, The International Court, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE
TWENT-FIRST CENTURY 17 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992).
162. HIRSCH, supra note 156, at xi. The International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID") arbitrates investment disputes arising between a sover-
eign state and a private investor. Id.
163. Janis, supra note 161, at 17.
164. HIRSCH, supra note 156, at 11.
165. SMITH, supra note 1, at 117.
166. HIRSCH, supra note 156, at 11.
167. Iran-United States: Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, 20 I.L.M. 223, 224
(1981) [hereinafter General Declaration]. The General Declaration, signed on January
19, 1981, is formally known as the Declaration for the Government of the Democratic
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United States intended the binding arbitration of the Iran-U.S.
Tribunal primarily to be a substitute forum for private claimants
in U.S. courts in an effort to facilitate the return of Iranian assets
along with the termination of litigation.169  Under the Claims
Settlement Declaration, claims satisfying subject-matter require-
ments include those claims arising from fiduciary relationships
and those affecting property rights. 7 ' The Claims Settlement
Declaration excludes claims arising from the Islamic Revolution
in Iran and the resulting hostage crisis.17' The Iran-U.S. Tribu-
nal hasjurisdiction to hear the claims of U.S. and Iranian nation-
als, 7  official claims,"7 ' and interpretive disputes, 174 but does not
have the authority to hear cases where U.S. nationals are the de-
fendants. 7
5
and Popular Republic of Algeria relating to the Commitments Made by Iran and the
United States. Id.
168. Iran-United States; Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, 20 I.L.M. 223, 231
(1981) [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration]. The Claims Settlement Declara-
tion, signed on January 19, 1981, is formally known as the Declaration of the Govern-
ment of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the Settlement
Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Id.
169. General Declaration, supra note 167, 1 B, at 224; David D. Caron, The Nature
of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of International Dispute
Resolution, 84 Am.J. INT'L L. 104, 136 (1990).
170. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 168, art. II(1), at 230-31. Under
the Claims Settlement Declaration, claims can arise for "debts, contracts (including
transactions that are the subject of letters or credit and bank guarantees), expropria-
tions or other measures affecting property rights." Id.
171. Id. art. II(1), at 231. The Claims Settlement Declaration references para-
graph 10 of the General Declaration which precludes claims arising from the seizure of
U.S. nationals during the Iranian Revolution, their detention, injury to property within
the U.S. Embassy compound, and injury resulting from non-Iranian acts. General Dec-
laration, supra note 167, 1 11, at 227.
172. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 168, art. II(1), at 230. Claims of
nationals include claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of
nationals of Iran against the United States. Id.
173. Id. art. 11(2), at 231. Official claims include "claims of the United States and
Iran against each other arising out of [certain] contractual arrangements between
them." Id.
174. Id. art. 11(3), at 231; General Declaration, supra note. 167, para. 17, at 228.
Interpretive disputes include "disputes between Iran and the United States concerning
the interpretation or application of the Claims Settlement Declaration." Claims Settle-
ment Declaration, supra note 168, at 231.
175. Interpretation of Algerian Declarations of 19 Jan. 1981 (Claims Against U.S.
Nationals), Dec. 21, 1981, reprinted in 62 I.LR. 595 (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. 1982).
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ii. Composition, Applicable Law, and Enforcement
The entire Iran-U.S. Tribunal consists of nine members, but
a panel of three members may decide claims. 176 The U.S. Gov-
ernment and the Iranian Government each appoint one third of
the Iran-U.S. Tribunal members and those members select the
remaining third of the members by mutual agreement. 177 The
members also appoint the President of the Iran-U.S. Tribunal
from the final third.17 1 Critics of the selection procedure note
the imbalance in power between the parties before the Iran-U.S.
Tribunalbecause the governments contribute to the selection of
the panel while parties actually bringing claims before the panel
have no power in the designation of a panel.1 79
Article 111(2) of the Claims Settlement Declaration
designates that the Iran-U.S. Tribunal follow the arbitration
rules of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law 80
("UNCITRAL"), except to the extent that parties or the Tribunal
choose to modify UNCITRAL rules."8 ' Pursuant to this permis-
sion to modify, Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration
replaced Article 33 of the UNCITRAL rules governing applica-
ble law.' 8 2 Article V instructs the Iran-U.S. Tribunal to apply
whatever commercial and contract law it deems applicable.1 8 3
Enforcement by the Tribunal varies for awards issued
176. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 168, art. III(1), at 231; John C.
Guilds III, "If It Quacks Like A Duck:" Comparing the ICJ Chambers to International Arbitra-
tion For A Mechanism of Enforcement, 16 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 32, 55 (1992).
177. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 168, art. III(1), at 231.
178. Id.
179. See Guilds, supra note 176, at 56 (discussing authority to choose members of
Iran-U.S. Tribunal).
180. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 168, art. 111(2), at 231. The United
Nations advanced the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in an effort to harmonize national
arbitration statutes. MATri PELONPAA & DAVID D. CARON, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES 1 (1994).
181. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 168, art. 111(2), at 231. The U.N.
Committee for International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") did not intend the arbitration
rules specifically for ad hoc arbitrations like the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, but the UN-
CITRAL Rules are flexible enough for adoption by such an arbitration. See HIRscH,
supra note 156, at 12 (discussing developments in international arbitration).
182. Guilds, supra note 176, at 60-61.
183. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 168, art. V, at 232. Article V pro-
vides, "[t ] he Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such
choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal
determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the trade, contract
provisions and changed circumstances." Id.
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against Iran and for those issued against the United States.'8 4
The agreements creating the Iran-U.S. Tribunal established an
escrow account containing funds for awards issued against
Iran.18 5 Parties must use their own domestic courts to enforce
and execute awards issued against the United States. 18 6 The ac-
tual mechanism used to enforce and execute Iran-U.S. Tribunal
awards against the United States is the Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards187 (the "New
York Convention"), which directs Contracting States to agree in
writing to submit to arbitration. 188 Under the New York Conven-
tion, parties must agree to accept arbitral awards as binding and
to enforce them using their own rules of procedure. 8 9
b. International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes
ICSID 19 ° is an arbitral institution that addresses only invest-
ment disputes. 91 ICSID settles disputes between sovereign states
184. See Guilds, supra note 176, at 69 (discussing enforcement and execution of
awards under Iran-U.S. Tribunal).
185. General Declaration, supra note 167, 2-5, at 225-26. The parties funded
the escrow account with "all gold bullion which is owned by Iran and which is in the
custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, together with all other Iran assets (or
the cash equivalent thereof) in the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
.... Id.
186. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 168, art. IV(3), at 232. Article
IV(3) of the Claims Settlement Declaration directs "[a]ny award which the Tribunal
may render against either government shall be enforced against such government in
the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws." Id.
187. 21 U.S.T. 2517 (June 10, 1958) [hereinafter New York Convention]. The
New York Convention is a uniform international arbitration system offering systematic
and effective enforcement of international arbitral awards. Krisin T. Roy, The New York
Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Policy Defense to Refuse Enforcement of
Non-Domestic Artibtral Awards?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 920, 925 (1995).
188. New York Convention, supra note 187, art. 11(1), at 2519; Guilds, supra note
176, at 69. In a 1989 ruling, Ministry of Defense v. Gould, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Algiers Accords between the two govern-
ments satisfied the New York Convention's requirement of an agreement in writing.
887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1989).
189. New York Convention, supra note 187, art. III, at 2519. Switzerland ratified
the New York Convention on June 1, 1965. Id. at 2565. The United States ratified the
New York Convention on September 30, 1970. Id. at 2566.
190. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, reprinted in, HMRScH, supra note 156, art. (1) (2), app. I, at 172
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
191. Id. One goal was that the ICSID would promote international investment by
removing the "obstacles from the path of international investment," thus potentially
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and private investors, usually multinational corporations. 192 IC-
SID founders intended ICSID as a forum to settle special needs
of the international community.19
3
i. Role
Founders of ICSID anticipated that ICSID would remove ex-
isting obstacles from the path of international investment,
thereby promoting international investment and potentially ac-
celerating the growth of developing countries.194 The Conven-
tion establishing ICSID, 195 the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States (the "ICSID Convention"), intentionally left the term in-
vestment undefined.196 This absence of a definition allows the
ICSID Convention to arbitrate innovative patterns of investment
that the ICSID Convention drafters did not foresee.1 97 In spirit
with the liberal interpretation the drafters intended for the word
investment, parties utilizing an ICSID tribunal also have full con-
trol over the composition of the tribunal, the law the tribunal
should apply, and the means of enforcing awards. 198
ii. Composition, Applicable Law, and Enforcement
Under ICSID rules governing the composition of an ICSID
tribunal, an ICSID tribunal must consist of an uneven number of
arbitrators upon whom the parties mutually agree.' 99 Parties se-
lect arbitrators from a list of potential arbitrators maintained by
accelerating the growth of developing countries. HIRSCH, supra note 156, at xi. Foun-
ders of ICSID also intended ICSID as a forum to settle special needs of the international
community. Id.
192. HIRSCH, supra note 156, at xi.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. ICSID Convention, supra note 190.
196. HIRScH, supra note 156, at 59.
197. Id.
198. See Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, reprinted in HIRSCH, supra
note 156, app. III, at 213 [hereinafter ICSID Rules] (setting forth rules governing IC-
SID tribunal).
199. See ICSID Convention, supra note 190, art. 37(2), at 184 (stating "[t]he Tribu-
nal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as
the parties shall agree."). "Where the parties do not agree upon the number of arbitra-
tors and the method of their appointment, the Tribunal shall consist of three arbitra-
tors, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the third, who shall be the president of
the Tribunal, appointed by agreement of the parties." Id. art. 37(2) (b), at 184.
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ICSID.2 °° Parties can also select an arbitrator not on the list pro-
vided the arbitrator is unbiased, of high character, and recog-
nized in the field of law. 20 1
Parties submitting to an ICSID tribunal have discretion in
defining the law an ICSID tribunal will apply.202 Under Article
42(1) of the ICSID Convention the ICSID tribunal will apply the
rules of law upon which the parties agree. 0 3 If no such agree-
ment exists, the ICSID tribunal will rely on the law of the host
state and the rules of international law. 0 4
The ICSID Convention enforces awards of ICSID arbitra-
tions.20 5 Under ICSID Convention rules, a contracting state
must recognize ICSID tribunal awards as binding and must en-
force them as if they were the final judgment of a court in that
state.20 6 Contracting states implement the ICSID Convention
through domestic legislation. 2 7 This implementing legislation
usually states that the contracting state will enforce an arbitral
award as though its own court rendered the decision.20° This
200. Guilds, supra note 176, at 57.
201. See ICSID Convention, supra note 190, art. 40, at 185 (discussing outside ap-
pointment of artibrators); id. art. 42, at 185 (setting forth law used in settling dispute).
202. See id. sec. 3, at 185 (defining powers and functions of ICSID Tribunal).
203. Id. Article 42(1) reads:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as
may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such an agreement, the Tribu-
nal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including
its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be
applicable.
Id.
204. Id. The ability to define the law the ICSID Tribunal will apply is particularly
beneficial for developing countries whose reluctance to use international arbitration is
rooted in the opinion that the norms of international law used by international arbitral
tribunals discriminate against them. HIRsCH, supra note 156, at 12.
205. See ICSID Convention, supra note 190, sec. 6, at 190 (defining recognition
and enforcement of award).
206. See id. art 54(1), at 190 (holding "[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an
award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obli-
gations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a
court in that State.").
207. See id. art. 69, at 195 (declaring "[e]ach Contracting State shall take such
legislative or other measures as may be necessary for making the provisions of this Con-
vention effective in its territories."). The United States became a Contracting State by
the entry into force of the ICSID Convention on October 14, 1966. HMRSCH, supra note
156, app. IV, at 242. The implementing legislation is codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1650(a)
(1988). Switzerland became a Contracting State on June 14, 1968. HiascH, supra note
156, at 241.
208. See S. REP. No. 1374, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2617,
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enforcement requirement effectively precludes any additional
inquiry into the merits of the underlying controversy by the con-
tracting states.2 °9
2. Adjudication
Although adjudication can assume various forms, it has
more established guidelines than arbitration.2 1' Two U.N. mem-
ber states that have a dispute may choose to utilize an ad hoc
chamber of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ" or
"Court"),2 11 which allows some freedom to design the adjudica-
tion proceedings. 12 Alternatively, parties who prefer the more
structured rules of litigation may adjudicate their claims in na-
tional courts. 13
a. ICJ Chambers
The ICJ is the judicial branch of the United Nations2 4 and
2618-19 (statement of Fred B. Smith, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury)
(explaining purpose of implementing Article 54(1) of ICSID Convention). The U.S.
General Counsel for the Department of the Treasury, Fred B. Smith, explained that the
purpose of the implementing legislation was to:
[I]mplement article 54(1) of the convention .. .[by stating that] an arbitral
award shall be enforced and shall be give the same full faith and credit as if
the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the
several States .... Essentially, this means that the district courts would be
precluded from inquiring into the merits of the underlying controversy.
Id.
209. Guilds, supra note 176, at 72.
210. Janis, supra note 161, at 20. Parties can voluntarily submit cases to the Inter-
national Court ofJustice ("ICJ"), for example, and define the legal questions the judges
are to consider and the sources of international law available to them. Id. This is con-
trasted to traditional adjudicatory forums like U.S. courts, where one party can force
the other to submit the claim, and the court controls the procedural rules. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (setting forth rules for adjudicating cases in Federal court).
211. Statute of the International Court ofJustice, art. 26(2), reprinted in BASIC DoC-
UMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 444 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1995) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
212. See Christine Gray & Benedict Kingsbury, Inter-State Arbitration Since 1945:
Overview and Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTv-FIRs~r CENTURY 56
(Mark W. Janis ed., 1992) (noting that ICJ Chambers allows parties more control over
design of proceedings than judicial settlement).
213. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P 3 (noting that in U.S. Federal Courts "a civil action is
commenced by filing a complaint with the Court.").
214. U.N. CHARTER art. 92 (setting forth that United Nations shall function in ac-
cordance with ICJ Statute). This is in contrast to the Security Council, the political
organ of the United Nations which handles peace and security issues. THOMASJ. BODIE,
POLITICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF AN AcrnisT INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1
(1995).
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all members of the United Nations are subject to the Statute of
the ICJ.2 1  The U.N. Charter limits ICJ jurisdiction to cases
brought by states, and therefore, private parties cannot appear
before the Court.2 16 This limitation severely limits the ICJ's ap-
plicability because much of international litigation stems from
private complaints. 7 Since its inception in 1945, there has
been a movement to increase the Court's utility by allowing par-
ties to use a smaller panel of the Court.2 18  This movement
culminated in the creation of the ad hoc Chambers of the ICJ
(the "Chamber") .219 The Chamber's guidelines allow parties
submitting claims to determine the Chamber's composition 221
and applicable law.22' The United Nations is responsible for en-
forcement of Chamber decisions and awards.2 22
i. Role of ICJ Chambers
In 1945, at the Washington Committee ofJurists, the United
States called for the formation of ad hoc Chambers223 whose
guidelines are now in Article 26(2) of the Statute of the ICJ. 2 2 4 A
1978 amendment to Article 17 of the ICJ Rules reflects Article
215. U.N. CHARTER art. 93(1). The ICJ replaced the Permanent International
Court ofJustice which the League of Nations established in 1922. Janis, supra note 161,
at 17-18. The two courts are substantially the same. BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 155, at 221. It is possible for a state that is not a member
of the United Nations to become a party to the ICJ Statue. U.N. CHARTER art. 93(2).
216. See ICJ Statute, supra note 211, art. 34(1), at 446 (stating "[o]nly States may be
parties in cases before the Court.").
217. SeeJanis, supra note 161, at 19 (discussing record of ICJ).
218. Id. at 32. The first proposal for the creation of Chambers dates back to the
1907 Peace Convention at The Hague and inspired the creation of the Chambers of
Summary Procedure under the Permanent Court of International Justice. Andreas
Zimmerman, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court ofJustice, 8 Dicr- J. INT'L L. 1, 2
(1989). Parties underutilized this chamber, however, because they lacked influence on
the composition of the chamber. Id. at 3. Parties voiced their interest in a chamber at
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in 1970-1971, and in 1972 and 1978 the
ICJ redefined the provisions regarding the formation of an ICJ Chamber. Id. at 5.
219. SeeJanis, supra note 161, at 33. Article 26(2) of the ICJ Statute enables parties
to form a chamber. ICJ Statute, supra note 211, art. 26(2), at 444. Article 17 of the ICJ
Rules sets forth the procedure for forming a chamber. Rules of Court, art. 17, reprinted
in, SHABTA! ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT 300 (1995) [hereinafter ICJ Rules].
220. See ICJ Statute, supra note 211, art. 26(2), at 444 (explaining formation of
Chamber).
221. See id. art. 38(1), at 448 (outlining sources of applicable law).
222. See U.N. CHARTER art. 94 (outlining enforcement of ICJ decisions).
223. Guilds, supra note 176, at 45.
224. ICJ Statute, supra note 211, art. 26(2), at 444. Article 26(2) reads, "[tihe
Court may At any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The number
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26(2)'s changes and outlines the creation of an ad hoc Cham-
ber. 25 Under Article 17, parties can form an ad hoc Chamber
upon the written request by one party and agreement by the
other.22 6
ii. Composition, Applicable Law, and Enforcement
An ad hoc Chamber consists of an odd number of judges,
who are existing members of the Court.2 Each party chooses
one-third of the judges, and the ICJ chooses the final third.228
The Chamber members elect the President from the final
third. 29 Parties generally select judges from those already on
the Court, though parties may select an ad hocjudge if they do
not have a national on the Court.2 0 The ability to pick an ad
hoc judge decreases a state's potential reluctance to submit
claims to the Chamber for fear that a judge's nationality might
ofjudges to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the ap-
proval of the parties." Id.
225. ICJ Rules, supra note 219, art. 17, at 300; Guilds, supra note 176, at 47.
226. ICJ Rules, supra note 219, art. 17, at 300. Article 17 reads:
1. A request for the formation of a Chamber ... may be filed at any time
until the closure of the written proceedings. Upon receipt of a request
made by one party, the President shall ascertain whether the other party
assents.
2. When the parties have agreed, the President shall ascertain their views
regarding the composition of the Chamber, and shall report to the Court
accordingly....
3. When the Court has determined, with the approval of the parties, the
number of its Members... to constitute the Chamber, it shall proceed to
their election [by secret ballot]....
Id.
227. ICJ Statute, supra note 211, art. 26(2), at 444; see Zimmerman, supra note 218,
at 16 (noting that odd number ofjudges comprises ICJ chamber). Under Article 26(2)
of the ICJ Statute, the ICJ determines the number of judges constituting an ad hoc
chamber, subject to the approval of the parties. ICJ Statute, supra note 211, art. 26(2),
at 444.
228. IqJ Rules, supra note 219, art. 35, at 307. See also Zimmerman, supra note 218,
at 15 (explaining that ICJ Statute excludes one-judge chamber).
229. Zimmerman, supra note 218, at 15.
230. Guilds, supra note 176, at 52. Article 31(2) provides, "[i]f the Court includes
... ajudge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person
[from outside the Court] to sit as a judge." ICJ Statute, supra note 211, art. 31(2), at
445. In this instance, a selection must satisfy specific requirements found in Article
31 (6) which states that any person selected to serve as ad hoc judge must be "of high
moral character, who possess[es] the qualifications required in [his/her] respective
countr[y] ... or [is a] jurisconsult[ ] of recognized competence in international law."
ICJ Statute, supra note 211, art. 2, at 438.
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color his or her decision.23 1 The final composition of the ad hoc
Chamber is subject to the approval of the parties, who may aban-
don an unsuitable Chamber altogether for another forum.232
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute outlines a Chamber's appli-
cation of international law when adjudicating a case.233 Article
38(1) mentions only the use of international conventions, inter-
national customs, and generally recognized principles of laws as
primary sources for establishing the Chamber's rules, but past
cases have expanded the possible sources to include the use of
treaties. 34 Parties now have the flexibility to form their own law
through carefully drafted treaties, conventions, and special
agreements. 23 5
Once a member of the United Nations submits to the ICJ's
231. Guilds, supra note 176, at 52. Generally, "[a]ll members of the United Na-
tions are automatically members as well of the present Court." BASic DOCUMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL" RELATIONS, supra note 155, at 272.
232. Guilds, supra note 176, at 51.
233. ICJ Statute, supra note 211, art. 38(1), at 448. Article 38(1) provides:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establish-
ing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various na-
tions, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Id.
234. ICJ Statute, supra note 211, art. 38(1) (a), at 448. Demonstrative of this is the
Gulf of Maine case, which was the first to utilize an ICJ Chamber. Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), Constitution of Chamber,
1982 I.C.J. 3, 8 (order of Jan. 20); Stephen M. Schwebel, New Life for World Court, 23
V.A. J. INT'L L. 375, 377 (1983). Pursuant to the Special Agreement between the
United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber applied certain tech-
nical provisions enumerated in Article IV of the Special Agreement. Gulf of Maine
Special Agreement, 20 I.L.M. 1371, 1378 (1981), art. IV; Guilds, supra note 176, at 60
n.59. This ensured that the Chamber would establish a precise and correct maritime
boundary. Id. Similarly, in the ELSI case, the Chamber strictly applied the rules previ-
ously recognized by Italy and the U.S. in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation ("FCN Treaty"). Elettronica Sicula S.pA (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), Constitution of
Chamber, 1987 I.C.J. 3 (order of Mar. 2); Guilds, supra note 176, at 59-60. In their
complaint, the United States alleged that Italy violated the FCN Treaty when it requisi-
tioned a U.S. company's Italian subsidiary, ELSI, thereby preventing the subsidiary's
liquidation and forcing the U.S. company into bankruptcy. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A.
(ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), Decision on the Merits, 1989 I.C.J. 15, 21 (order of July 20).
235. Guilds, supra note 176, at 60.
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jurisdiction,236 that member agrees to abide by the decisions of
the ICJ. 23 7 The U.N. Charter names the U.N. Security Council as
the body responsible for enforcement of ICJ decisions.238 There
has been difficulty in getting states to submit their disputes to a
Chamber.23 9
b. Claims in U.S. Federal Courts
In the United States, parties may file a class action suit
240
when the number of plaintiffs is so numerous that it is impracti-
cable for each to appear individually before a court. 4 1 U.S. fed-
eral courts have demonstrated reluctance to intervene in inter-
national disputes.2 This reluctance is particularly acute where
a party is a foreign government and the suit potentially may af-
236. See ICJ Statute, supra note 211, art. 36(5), at 448 (noting that declarations of
compulsory jurisdiction under the Permanent International Court ofJustice are still in
force under the ICJ Statute). What remains uncertain, however, is the scope of the
ICJ's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 392, 11 17-32, at 400-07 (I.C.J., Nov. 26,
1984) (No. 70) [hereinafter Nicaragua] (setting forth arguments about the extent of
ICJ's jurisdiction).
237. See U.N. CHARTER art. 94(1) (stating "[e]ach Member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court ofJustice in any case
to which it is a party.").
238. U.N. CHARTER art. 94(2). Article 94(2) states:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under
a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the
Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
Id. States rarely refuse to carry out the decisions of international tribunals. FOREST L.
GRIEVES, SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 112 (1969).
239. See, e.g., Nicaragua, 1 17-32, at 400-07 (illustrating member states' insistence
that case did not fall within jurisdiction of ICJ); see also BODIE, supra note 214, at 1
(discussing Nicaragua briefly as example of debate over ICJ's jurisdictional boundary).
240. See 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcTiONS § 1.01, at
1-2 (3rd ed. 1992) (hereinafter CLAss AcTIONS] (describing class action suits as repre-
sentative suits filed on behalf of group of similarly situated persons).
241. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (setting forth rules governing class action suits). The
Supreme Court endorsed the use of class actions noting "[w ] here it is not economically
feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small indi-
vidual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless
they may employ the class-action device." Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
242. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India
in December 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting in dicta that U.S. courts
should not decide cases evaluating effectiveness and application of foreign laws), affd,
809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Union of India v. Union Carbide Corp., 484
U.S. 871 (1987).
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fect the foreign government's constituents.243
i. Class Action Suits in U.S. Federal Courts
Class actions are representative suits on behalf of a group of
similarly situated persons.244  When plaintiffs' claims and de-
fenses are substantially similar, it is more judicially efficient and
cost effective for plaintiffs to file their claims together as a single
class action suit.24 5 Class actions also spread out litigation costs
which effectively grants plaintiffs with small claims access tojudi-
cial relief where the cost of an individual lawsuit would have
been prohibitive.2 46 Any award granted binds every member of
the class, although members at times have the opportunity to
opt out of the class depending on the remedy sought.2 4 7 A rep-
resentative plaintiff,248 with individual standing, 49 who satisfies
the class action requirements, 2 50 may bring a class action suit.251
243. Id.
244. CLAss ACTIONS, supra note 240, § 1.01, at 1-2.
245. 3BJAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02, at 23-33 to 23-
34 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACnCE] (classifying class action suits
as effective alternative when rules of joinder are impracticable or impossible); CLAss
AcTnONS, supra note 240, § 1.10, at 1-3.
246. See CLAss ACTIONS, supra note 240, § 1.06, at 1-18 (discussing objectives of
class action suit).
247. See FED. R. Cwv. P. 23 (setting forth requirements for class action suit). A class
certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) seeks injunctive or declaratory relief. MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra note 245, 1 23.31 [2], at 23-236 n.2. A class certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) often seeks monetary damages. Id. 23.31 [2], at 23-235. Members of a
Rule (23) (b) (3) class can choose to opt-out of the class in order to preserve their ability
to pursue individual claims. FED. R. Crv. P. 23, Supplementary Note of Advisory Com-
mittee, 1966 Amendment, subdivision (c)(2). Rule 23(c)(2), therefore, requires plain-
tiffs certifying under Rule 23(b) (3) to notify all members of the class who can be identi-
fied through reasonable effort. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
248. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra note 245, 23.07[1], at 23-183 to 23-
193 (discussing requirements for representative parties who are suing on behalf of
others similarly situated).
249. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1985) (discussing
requirements for federal standing). Federal standing stems from the constitutional re-
quirement that every plaintiff have a case or controversy to file a claim in court. U.S.
CONSr. art. III, § 2 (setting forth extent ofjudicial power). Federal standing requires
the plaintiff to have an allegation of present or immediate injury in fact and a personal
stake in the outcome. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 804.
250. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (setting forth requirements for federal class action suit).
Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the claimants under a proposed
class action suit must be so numerous as to preclude joining claims. Id. Also, claimants
must have questions of law or fact in common, claims and defenses typical to the class,
and representative parties and lawyers who will fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class. Id.
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Representative plaintiffs must have individual standing to
bring claims on behalf of other class members.25 2 This is a strict
requirement and courts will dismiss cases because of a lack of
standing before determining whether a class exists. 53 The
standing issue, however, refers only to whether the representa-
tive plaintiff is properly before the court, not to whether repre-
sented members are properly before the court.25 4 Represented
members of the class do not need to show individual standing.255
After a court has determined that the representative plain-
tiffs have standing, representative plaintiffs must petition the
court to certify the class based on'the class definition provided in
their pleading.2 6  Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, representative plaintiffs must base their class action
suit on similar claims and a proposed class must satisfy the re-
quirements of numerosity,257 commonality,258 typicality, 259 and
251. See CLAss ACriONS, supra note 240, § 2.01, at 2-2 to 2-3 (discussing require-
ments for bringing federal class action suit).
252. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). In O'Shea, the U.S. Supreme
Court held, "if none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes
the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on
behalf of himself or any other member of the class." Id. at 494. A litigant, therefore,
must assert his or her own legal interests rather than those of third parties. See Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953) (holding "one may not claim standing in this Court
to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party.").
253. See, e.g., O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 494 n.3 (dismissing case for lack of standing).
254. CLAss AcrIONS, supra note 240, § 2.07, at 2-4L
255. Id. at 2-40.
256. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (setting forth rules for certifying federal class action
suit). The courts strictly apply the certification requirements of Rule 23 to identify the
common interests of class members and to ensure that the named plaintiffs and their
counsel fairly and adequately protect the class's interests. In re General Motors Corp.
Pickup Truck Fuel.Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. General Motors Corp. v. French, _U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
257. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Class certification requires that "the class [be] so
numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable." Id. This is considered in the
context of Rule 23(b) (3), which requires that "a class action [be] superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Id. "The
substantive nature of the claim, the type of class suit, and the relief requested.., bear
on... the necessary showing of numerosity in relation to impracticability ofjoinder."
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACGI-CE, supra note 245, 1 23.05[3], at 23-151 to 23-153; see, e.g.,
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown v. Coca-Cola Co., 95 F.R.D. 168, 174-75 (D.
Del. 1982) (noting that showing of impossibility satisfied for class action containing 51
to 96 members scattered over 32 states).
258. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Class certification requires that "there are questions
of law or fact common to the class." Id. This is considered in the context of Rule
23(b) (3), which requires "the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." FED. R. Civ.
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adequacy of representation.2 60  A proposed class need not be
fully determined prior to certification. 261 A class may include
future claimants, plaintiffs not currently in existence, those who
will have a future status, or those affected by a future contin-
gency.262
Future claimants, however, can at times undermine the re-
quirements for certification.263 In Georgine v. Amchem Products
P. 23(b) (3). Rule 23(a) (2) does not require prospective class members to have all ques-
tions of law and fact in common. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra note 245, 23.06-1,
at 23-159. An acceptable common question, for example, relates to whether officials
had complied with statutory requirements in administering a program affecting a large
number of persons. See McNeill v. New York City Housing Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (involving housing authority application of policies to low-income
housing tenants).
259. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Class certification requires that "the claims or de-
fenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Id.
The typicality requirement's main purpose is to help protect the interests of the repre-
sented class members who are bound by the result. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra
note 245, 23.06[2], at 23-178. The size of the proposed class does not necessarily
prevent plaintiffs from satisfying this requirement. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 169 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1988) (noting
that 240,000 people filed claims).
260. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(4). Class certification requires that "the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Id. This require-
ment is predicated on the due process requirement for adequate representation in a
binding action against members of a class. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940)
(holding that case not binding on person who was not party). Pursuant to this require-
ment of adequate representation, the plaintiffs' attorney must be qualified and the
plaintiffs must not have interests antagonistic to those of the remainder of the class.
Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 479
F.2d 1005 (2d cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); see also In re Johns-Manville
Corp. v. Blinken, 982 F.2d 721, 743 (2d. Cir. 1992) (noting abrogation of future claim-
ants' rights when named plaintiffs consented to settlement which affected them differ-
ently).
261. See Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting possibility of certifi-
cation for amorphous group). In Mead, the class included inmates petitioning for writ
of habeus corpus. Id. at 1110. The proposed amorphous class included all present and
future indigent inmates wanting to commence or defend a proceeding in court. Id. at
1113.
262. CLAss AC'rIONS, supra note 240, § 2.03, at 2-16 to 2-18.
263. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3rd Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996) (reversing district court
and decertifying class that included future claimants on grounds that class failed to
satisfy Rule 23's requirements of typicality, adequacy of representation, predominance,
and superiority). But see In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. v. Diamond Shamrock
Chem. Co., 996 F.2d 1425, 1435-36 (1993) (noting properly structured settlement
agreements eliminate conflict of interest between present and future claimants), cert.
denied sub nom. Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 510 U.S. 1140 (1994).
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Inc.," the district court certified a class pursuant to the require-
ments of an asbestos settlement.2 65 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and decertified the
class. 266 In rejecting the district court's expansive reading of the
requirements under Rule 23, the Court of Appeals noted that
the sheer size of the class, which included current and future
claimants, made it virtually impossible to satisfy the class action
requirements of Rule 23.267 The proposed class failed to satisfy
the commonality requirement because of the considerable dif-
ference in the factual and legal issues each individual plaintiff
raised, along with the choice of law considerations. 68 The
Court held that a conflict of interest existed between the current
and future claimants which undermined the requirements of
typicality and adequacy of representation because the current
claimants were seeking to maximize front-end benefits, while the
future claimants had an interest in preserving as large a fund as
possible.269 The possible 250,000 to 2,000,000 claimants, cou-
pled with the inclusion of future claimants, raised efficiency and
fairness concerns which made it impracticable to try the claims
in the context of a class action. 2
70
ii. International Claims
U.S. courts have at times demonstrated reluctance to inter-
264. 83 F.3d 610 (3rd Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996).
265. Id.
266. Amchem, 83 F.3d at 618.
267. Id. According to the Court of Appeals, the class would "settle the claims of
between 250,000 and 2,000,000 individuals who have been exposed to asbestos products
against the twenty companies known as the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR)." Id. at
617 (footnote omitted).
268. Id. Choice of law considerations complicate matters because applying the
same state law to class members in a nationwide class action violates due process and
full faith and credit clauses when the members' state laws conflict. Shutts, 474 U.S. at
797. The Amchem case implicates the choice of law concern because the states have
different rules for many issues raised by plaintiffs including viability of future claims,
availability of causes of action for medical monitoring, causation, proof required to
prove exposure, statutes of limitations, joint and several liability, and comparative and
contributory negligence. Amchem, 83 F.3d at 627.
269. Amchem, 83 F.3d at 618, 630.
270. Id. at 632. Efficiency concerns centered on whether the magnitude and com-
plexity of the trial would make it impossible to reconcile the uncommon issues for trial.
Id. at 632-33. The fairness issue concerns the possibility that future claimants may be
bound to a settlement without knowledge of its existence. Id. at 633. This is especially
problematic for exposure-only plaintiffs without knowledge of their exposure, who
would neglect to consider whether to opt-out of the class. Id. at 634.
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vene in international disputes. 271 Demonstrative of this was the
dismissal of claims against Union Carbide Corporation.272 The
claims stemmed from the December 1984 gas leak at Union Car-
bide Corporation's 273 gas plant in Bhopal, India which caused
over 2000 deaths and 200,000 injuries.2 74 Plaintiffs brought ac-
tions in U.S. district courts against Union Carbide for injuries
and damages sustained as a result of the leak.2 75 The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation joined the actions and assigned
them to the District Court of the Southern District of New
York,276 which dismissed the claims on the grounds of forum
non conveniens. 277 The court recognized in dicta the Indian
Government's profound interest in the adequacy and compli-
ance of Indian safety regulations.2 78  The court further deter-
271. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 842 (noting in dicta that
U.S. courts should not be deciding whether Union Carbide Corporation breached In-
dian regulations); Bybee v. Oper Der Standt Bonn, 899 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (noting Germany's interest outweighs U.S. interests because subject matter in-
volves German language contract requiring performance in Germany and allegations
are against significant institutions in which Germany has substantial interest). But see
Massaquoi v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, 945 F. Supp. 58, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting
that balance between private and public factors must be strongly in defendant's favor
when plaintiff is U.S. citizen and alternative forum is foreign).
272. Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 842.
273. Id. at 834. Union Carbide Corporation is a U.S. corporation incorporated in
the state of New York. Id.
274. John Curran, BIv. Union Carbide Chemicals &Plastics Co., et al, 984 F.2d 582 (2d
Cir. 1993), 6 N.Y. IrNr'L L. REv. 127, 127 n.3. (1993). Human exposure to the gas that
escaped, methyl isocyanate, causes a multitude of ailments including lung, spleen, and
liver damage, blindness, nervous and psychological disorders, and gynecological dam-
age and birth defects. Hanson Hosein, Unsettling: Bhopal and the Resolution of Interna-
tional Disputes Involving an Environmental Disaster, 16 B.C. Irr'L & Comp. L. REv. 285, 286
(1993).
275. Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 844.
276. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December,
1984, 601 F. Supp. 1035 (1985).
277. Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 867. Forum non conveniens refers to the
discretionary power of the court to decline jurisdiction when the convenience of parties
and the ends ofjustice would be better served if the action were brought and tried in
another forum. BLACK'S LAW DicrIONAYv, supra note 155, at 655. The Court in Union
Carbide Corp. applied forum non conveniens because of significant private interest con-
cerns, namely the inaccessibility of the majority of witnesses and plaintiffs who reside in
India, and public interest concerns, including administrative costs to U.S. taxpayers and
the application of international law. Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 866-67.
278. See Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 864.' The court held, "(the Indian
government, which regulated the Bhopal facility, has an extensive and deep interest in
ensuring that its standards for safety are complied with. As regulators, the Indian gov-
ernment and individual citizens even have an interest in knowing whether extant regu-
lations are adequate." Id.
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mined that U.S. courts should not be deciding whether Union
Carbide breached Indian regulations or whether the laws them-
selves offered Indian citizens sufficient protection from harm. 79
II. ADDRESSING CLAIMS MADE ON DORMANT SWISS BANK
ACCOUNTS: INSTITUTIONAL, NATIONAL, AND
PRIVATE APPROACHES
Since 1995, the Swiss banks, 8 ° the Swiss Government,8 t the
U.S. Congress,282 private individuals,'28  and independent organi-
zations have all taken initiatives to facilitate the settlement of
outstanding factual and legal disputes surrounding the fate of
dormant Swiss bank accounts.28 4 Factual disputes include the
existence and value of the dormant accounts in question.285
Legal disputes include questions over how to identify dormant
accounts belonging to people who subsequently perished in the
Holocaust28 6 and how to match those accounts with legitimate
279. Id. The court held, "[i]t would be sadly paternalistic, if not misguided, of this
Court to attempt to evaluate the regulations and standards imposed in a foreign coun-
try." Id.
280. See Global Survey, supra note 17, at 136 (discussing new banking guidelines
adopted which relax requirements for claiming dormant accounts and establishment of
Central Contact Office to facilitate handling of claims).
281. See Historians' Report, supra note 13 (providing historical report entitled "As-
sets in Switzerland of Victims of Nazism and the Compensation Agreements with East
Bloc Countries"); Swiss Federal Decree of December 13, 1996, supra note 12 (establish-
ing independent committee of experts).
282. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 19 (inquiring about assets held in dor-
mant Swiss bank accounts); House Hearings, supra note 2 (questioning Swiss representa-
tives about their commitment to returning unclaimed dormant accounts to their right-
ful owners).
283. See e.g., Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96 CV 4849 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Oct. 3, 1996, Am. Compl. filed Jan. 24, 1997) (setting forth class action suit filed
on behalf of Holocaust survivors); Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96 CV
5161 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 21, 1996) (setting forth class action suit filed on behalf of
heirs of Holocaust victims); World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communities, Inc. v.
Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 97 CV 0461 (E.D.N.Y. filedJan. 29, 1997) (setting forth
class action suit filed on behalf of Holocaust survivors and their descendants world-
wide).
284. See Volcker Agreement, supra note 8 (establishing independent commission
to oversee audit of dormant Swiss bank accounts).
285. See Daly, supra note 7, at 2-3. A 1995 audit by the Swiss Bankers Association
revealed US$32 million found in 775 accounts that might belong to Holocaust victims.
Id. Representatives ofJewish organizations claim that as much as US$7 billion remains
in unclaimed bank accounts. Policy of Deceit, supra note 7, at 18. A substantial part of
the US$7 billion estimate may represent money from unpaid life insurance policies. Id.
286. Comments & Analysis: Clock Ticks on Buried Jewish Treasure, FIN. TIMEs
(London), Aug. 3, 1996, at 7.
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heirs.287
A. Swiss Banks' 1995 Banking Law Revision Regarding Dormant
Accounts
In 1995, the Swiss banks adopted guidelines regarding dor-
mant accounts288 in an effort to relieve the effects of the previ-
ous strict adherence to secrecy laws.2 89 The guidelines relaxed
the requirements for returning dormant bank accounts to their
rightful heirs.29 ° Prior to the guidelines, claimants had to pres-
ent evidence to establish their rights to an inheritance, including
bank documents establishing the existence of the account.291
Many heirs were not in possession of such documents, however,
as the Nazis liquidated and destroyed villages ofJews.29 2 In con-
trast, the new guidelines provide service to heirs of individuals
who were presumably customers of a Swiss bank,293 even when
the heir cannot identify the exact bank concerned. 94
Under the guidelines, the Swiss Bankers Association created
the Contact Office for the Search for Dormant Accounts Admin-
istered by Swiss Banks. 95 The Swiss Banking Ombudsman heads
the Contact Office.2 96 To initiate a search, claimants must satisfy
287. See Swiss Civil Code, title XIII (setting forth Swiss inheritance laws).
288. Global Survey, supra note 17, at 136. The guidelines cover the handling of
dormant accounts, custody accounts, and safe-deposit boxes. Id.
289. See, e.g., Picard Report, supra note 13, § 4.4, at 8 (noting Swiss Bankers Associ-
ation's opposition to measures for registering assets under Swiss Federal Resolution of
December 20, 1962, on theory that registration requirements would be an unacceptable
breach of banking and professional secrecy); see supra notes 134-154 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Federal Resolution of December 20, 1962).
290. Global Survey, supra note 17, at 136.
291. See Historians' Report, supra note 13, pt. 111(2), at 3-4 (discussing documents
required for claiming dormant accounts). Under the past practices, claimants also had
to provide either a confidential password or an account number. Irwin Block, Swiss
Helping in Search For Owners of Long-dormant Accounts, MONTREAL GAZETrE, July 15, 1996,
at AS.
292. DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 34, at 173.
293. Ian Wylie, UK Heirs to Plundered Gold, GUARDIAN, Sept. 21, 1996, at 004. Under
the new guidelines, a claimant can satisfy this presumption with as little information as
a surname. Id.
294. Global Survey, supra note 17, at 136.
295. Newsletter of the Geneva Private Bankers Association, (visited Mar. 2, 1997) <http:/
/www.geneve-finance.ch/En/Letter-gbpg.htm> [hereinafter Bank Newsletter] (also on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal); Global Survey, supra note 17, at 136. Any
heir may now request the Ombudsman's office to proceed to an inquiry among the
banks in Switzerland. Id.
296. Bank Newsletter, supra note 295. An ombudsman is a neutral and independent
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threshold information requirements, including the name of the
account owner, the likelihood that he or she is dead or pre-
sumed dead, the existence of an account, the region in which
the account is located, and the claimant's inheritance rights to
the existing account.1
9 7
On November 12, 1996, the Banking Ombudsman reported
that from January 1, 1996 to September 30, 1996, applicants sub-
mitted 2229 inquires to the Central Contact Office, of which
1055 applicants returned the completed questionnaire. 298 Of
those questionnaires completed, the banks conducted further
research in fifty-five cases and located assets belonging to eleven
claimants for a total of sFr 1.6 million. 299 Only three of those
claimants were victims of the Holocaust.300 Assets belonging to
victims of the Holocaust totaled approximately sFr 11,000. ° t
The Central Contact Office attributes the minimal results to
the previous registration attempts of the 1962 Federal Resolu-
official to which people can forward their claims. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY, supra note
155, at 1088. The Ombudsman represents the person before the banks. Id. The Bank-
ing Ombudsman's recommendation is not binding on either the customer or the bank.
The Swiss Banking Ombudsman, (visited Mar. 2, 1997) <http://www.geneve-finance.ch/
En/Ombudsman.htm> (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The
secrecy laws apply to the Banking Ombudsman. Id.
297. Who May Introduce a Search and How? (visited Mar. 2, 1997), <http://
www.geneve-finance.ch/En/Contact..OfficeQ3.htm> (also on file with the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal). Under the Swiss Bankers Association's guidelines, before the
banks will initiate a search, the claimant must satisfy five conditions:
1. Substantiate that an account might exist in Switzerland;
2. Supply the name of the person whose account is sought;
3. Explain that the bank customer has been dead or presumed dead for ten
years or more;
4. Substantiate his claim to the existing account;
5. Explain in which region of Switzerland to search.
Id.
298. How Many Demands Were Received By The Central Contact Office? (visited Mar. 2,
1997) <http://www.geneve-finance.ch/En/ContactOfficeQ7.htm> (also on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal). Of the 1055 who responded, 45% live in the
United States and Israel. Id. This breaks down to 29%, or 306, from the United States,
and 16%, or 169, from Israel. Id.
299. What Are The Results Already Reached? (visited Mar. 2, 1997) <http://
www.geneve-finance.ch/En/ContactOfficeQ8.htm> [hereinafter Results Already
Reached] (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
300. The Newsletter of the Geneva Private Bankers Association, Switzerland and World War
II: What Has Been Done to Shed Light on the Past, (visited Mar. 2, 1997) <http://
www.geneve-finance.ch/En/Letter-gbpg2.htm> (also on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal); Results Already Reached, supra note 299.
301. Results Already Reached, supra note 299.
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tion, which required banks to relinquish to a registration author-
ity dormant assets belonging to victims of persecution by the Na-
zis. 302 The Central Contact Office also points to cases where in-
quires unearthed worthless bonds and securities.3" 3 A lack of
bank documentation also complicated matters.30 4  Because
banks held documentation of a terminated customer for only
ten years, banks could not prove that an account-holder or proxy
legitimately closed an account.0 5
B. Swiss Government to Establish a Historical Basis for Claims
The Swiss Government has attempted to resolve historical
questions surrounding assets in Switzerland belonging to Nazi
victims.30 6 On October 29, 1996, the Swiss Government commis-
sioned a report entitled Assets in Switzerland of Victims of Na-
zism and the Compensation Agreements with East Bloc Coun-
tries (the "Historians' Report") concerning claims that the Swiss
Government used the unclaimed bank accounts of Holocaust
victims to compensate Swiss citizens for property seized in East-
ern Europe. 30 7 The two Swiss historians who prepared the His-
torians' Report3 8 examined relevant Swiss Federal Archive files
relating to compensation agreements reached after World War
II with the then-Communist regimes of Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary. 30 9 In their report,
the historians suggested approaches to facilitate the identifica-
302. How Can These Disappointing Results Be Explained? (visited Mar. 2, 1997) <http:/
/www.geneve-finance.ch/En/Contact-OfficeQ9. htm> [hereinafter Explaining Disap-
pointing Results] (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); supra notes
134-147 and accompanying text (discussing 1962 Federal Resolution).
303. Explaining Disappointing Results, supra note 302.
304. What Are the Main Difficulties Encountered By the Central Contact Office? (visited
Mar. 2, 1997) <http://www.geneve-finance.ch/En/ContactOfficeQ6.htm> (also on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
305. Id. After ten years, no trace of the account exists. Id.
306. House Hearings, supra note 2. Ambassador Thomas Borer, Head of the Swiss
Task Force for the Assets of Nazi Victims, testified on the Swiss Government's attempts
to settle allegations concerning Switzerland's dealings with Nazi Germany during World
War II. Id.
307. William Hall, Holocaust Probe Ordered, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1996, at 2. The
report, datedJanuary 17, 1997, is titled "Assets in Switzerland of Victims of Nazism and
the Compensation Agreements with East Bloc Countries," Historians' Report, supra
note 13.
308. See Historians' Report, supra note 13 (noting that historians who prepared
report are Mr. Peter Hug of Bern University, and Mr. Marc Perrenoud of Neuchatel).
309. Id. at introduction.
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tion of heirs with rights to unclaimed assets that belonged to
victims of the Holocaust. 310
On December 13, 1996, a Swiss Federal Decree (the "Fed-
eral Decree") established a separate independent commission of
experts (the "ICEC") to investigate the historical and legal fate
of assets which reached Switzerland as a result of the Nazi re-
gime. 31 1 The ICEC's investigation is to cover the entire gamut of
wartime transactions with Germany, from dormant accounts to
looted gold.312 The Historian's Report directs the ICEC to ex-
310. Id. introduction, para. 1. The historians recommend, "the files on registered
property belonging to depositors from Eastern European states, which have been re-
tained complete and in good order in the Swiss Federal Archives, should be reviewed
and any surviving claimants sought without delay." Id., pt. 111(4), at 30. Further, they
note, "[iun the case of property transferred to Poland... the Polish government will
have to pay out those entitled. In all other cases the Swiss federal government is re-
sponsible for money which it had transferred to the Unclaimed Asset Fund [pursuant to
the Swiss Federal Resolution of December 20, 1962]." Id. Poland's involvement stems
from money made available to Poland in 1975 from the Unclaimed Asset Fund. Id. pt.
IV(9), at 20. The Swiss Government transferred the money pursuant to the 1949 Swiss-
Polish compensation agreement governing Polish unclaimed assets remaining in Swiss
banks. Id., pt. IV(3), at 6-7.
311. Swiss Federal Decree of December 13, 1996, supra note 12, art. 1. The Swiss
Government appointed a total of nine people with extensive historical and legal knowl-
edge. Swiss Press Release, Appointment of the Independent Commission of Experts, Dec. 19,
1996 (visited Feb. 20, 1997) <http://www.Swissemb.org> [hereinafter Appointment of Ex-
perts] (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The independent com-
mittee of experts' ("ICEC") Chairman is Jean-Frangois Bergier, a Swiss historian. In-
dependent Commission of Experts, The Members of the Commission (visited Mar. 2, 1997)
<http://www.geneve-finance.ch/En/Commission-Composition.htm> (also on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal). The other eight members of the ICEC include
Wladyslow Bartoszewski, a Polish historian; Saul Friedlaender, an Israeli historian; Har-
oldJames, a U.S. historian; Georg Kreis, a Swiss historian; Sybil Milton, a U.S. historian;
Jacques Picard, a Swiss historian;Jakob Tanner, a Swiss historian; andJoseph Voyame, a
Swiss lawyer. Id.
312. Swiss Federal Decree of December, 13, 1996, supra note 12, art. 1. Article
1 (1) reads:
1. The investigation covers the extent and fate of assets of all kinds which
were transferred to banks, insurance companies, attorneys, notaries, fidu-
ciaries, asset managers or other physical or legal persons or groups of per-
sons residing or headquartered in Switzerland for deposit, investment or
transfer to third parties, or were acquired by such physical or legal persons
or groups of persons or were received by the Swiss National Bank and
a. belonged to persons who became victims of National Socialist rule or
about whom, because of this rule, reliable information is not available,
and whose assets have since then not been claimed by legitimate
claimants;
b. as a consequence of the racial laws or other discriminatory measures
within the sphere of the National Socialist German Reich were taken
from their rightful owners; or
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amine the fate of the assets of victims in its entirety.3 13 The
ICEC will have access to records within the Swiss National Bank,
the cantons, courts, relevant associations, and private assets ad-
ministrators, including banks, insurance companies, and law-
yers. 14 The Federal Decree orders those institutions affected to
lift the secrecy laws usually surrounding protected information
such as financial records.3 15  The Federal Decree establishing
the ICEC is valid for five years, 16 but the Swiss Government does
not expect the Commission to take five years to complete the
investigation.317
C. U.S. Congress
On April 23, 1996, the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs ("Senate Banking Committee") ad-
dressed the issue of the dormant accounts. 318 The Senate Bank-
c. originate from members of the NSDAP, from the National-Socialist
German Reich, its institutions or representatives as well as physical or
legal persons closely connected with it, including all financial transac-
tions which were carried out with these assets.
Id.
313. Historians' Report, supra note 13, introduction, sec. 2(3), at 3.
314. Id. introduction, at 1.
315. Swiss Federal Decree of December 13, 1996, supra note 12, art. 5. Article 5,
titled "Obligation to Grant Access to Records," reads:
1. The persons and institutions mentioned in Article 1, their legal successors
as well as authorities and government offices are obligated to grant access
to all records pertaining to the investigation to the members of the com-
mission of experts appointed by the Federal Council and researchers ap-
pointed by them.
2. The obligation to grant access to the records takes precedence over any
legal or contractual secrecy obligation.
Id.
316. Id. art. 11(3). The Swiss Federal Decree expires on December 31, 2001. Id.
317. Appointment of Experts, supra note 311.
318. See Senate Hearings, supra note 19 (discussing fate of dormant Swiss bank ac-
counts). All international banks operating in the United States are subject to the same
banking regulations that govern U.S. banks. See INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKERS,
Banking in a Global Economy: Economic Benefits to the United States from the Activities of Inter-
national Banks 7 (Sept. 1993) [hereinafter Banking in a Global Economy] (discussing U.S.
Government's jurisdiction over international banks) (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal). Banking regulations come under the jurisdiction of the Senate
Banking Committee. Id. "The International Banking Act of 1978 (the "IBA") [12
U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108] created a comprehensive federal regulatory framework for inter-
national banks operating in the United States through branches and agencies, includ-
ing subjecting international banks to . . .examination and supervision by the Federal
Reserve and other federal banking agencies." Id. at 7. "The Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act of 1991 (the "FBSEA") [Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991)] sig-
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ing Committee conducted a round of hearings to inquire about
the assets held in dormant Swiss bank accounts and to help facili-
tate the return of those assets. 319 Under the guidance of the
Senate Banking Committee's Chairperson, Senator Alfonse M.
D'Amato, the Committee conducted these hearings and also
called for the declassification of relevant Nazi-era documents, in
the hope of resolving the outstanding claims.312 1 President Bill
Clinton pledged the White House's support in facilitating the
resolution of claims by speeding up the declassification of U.S.
documents relating to dormant bank accounts of Nazi victims
and Nazi assets held in Switzerland.3 21
At a second round of hearings, held on December 11, 1996,
members of the U.S. House Committee on Banking and Finan-
cial Services questioned Swiss Government and Bank representa-
tiveS 22 about their commitment to resolve issues surrounding
the unclaimed accounts. 323 Opening remarks by Thomas Borer,
a Swiss diplomat and head of the Swiss Task Force handling alle-
gations of the role of Swiss authorities during World War II, fo-
cused on current inquiries the Swiss Government is making in
an effort to facilitate the return of assets to heirs of the Holo-
caust victims.3 2 4 Testimony by Georg Krayer, the chairman of
the Swiss Bankers Association, did not reveal new information
nificantly strengthened the Federal Reserve's examination and supervisory authority
over the U.S. operations of international banks and required the Federal Reserve to
establish and implement standards for international bank entry and expansion in the
United States." Id.
319. Senate Hearings, supra note 19. The witnesses' testimony ranged from anec-
dotes to statistics. Id. Those testifying before the Committee included Stuart E. Eizen-
stat, Under Secretary for International Trade at the Department of Congress; Edgar M.
Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress and President of the World Jewish
Restitution Organization; HansJ. Baer, Chairman of Baer Holding Ltd. and BankJulius
Baer, on behalf of the Swiss Bankers Association; and Ms. Greta Beer, a Holocaust survi-
vor. Id.
320. Id.
321. Norma Cohen, Clinton Pledge on Nazi Gold, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 5, 1996,
at 3. In a different direction, Under Secretary of Commerce Stuart Eizenstat is coordi-
nating a study on Nazi placement of gold and looted assets. David Sanger, Swiss Envoy
in U.S. in Midst of Squall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1997 [hereinafter Swiss Envoy in U.S.].
Historians involved in the study are examining archives of the State Department, the
Treasury, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Pentagon. Id.
322. See David E. Sanger, Swiss Promise 'Sweeping Study' Into Jewish Victims' Money,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at A9 (discussing testimony of diplomat Thomas Borer, head
of Switzerland's task force, and Georg Krayer, chairman of Swiss Bankers Association).
323. House Hearings, supra note 2.
324. See id. (providing opening remarks of Ambassador Thomas Borer).
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about the possible current existence of-large bank accounts orig-
inally deposited by either Jews or Nazi leadership.325
D. Private Claims in U.S. Courts
There are currently three class action suits pending in U.S.
courts on outstanding issues relating to victims of the Holo-
caust. 3 26 All three suits address the assets remaining in Swiss
bank accounts which allegedly belong to the heirs of Nazi vic-
tims. 3 27 The representative plaintiffs in the first suit, Weisshaus v.
Union Bank of Switzerland, are all Holocaust survivors. 32 8 The rep-
resentative plaintiffs in the second suit, Friedman v. Union Bank of
Switzerland, are all children of Holocaust victims.3 29 The repre-
sentative plaintiffs in the third suit, World Council of Orthodox Jew-
ish Communities, Inc. v. Union Bank of Switzerland, are all aged Hol-
ocaust survivors and their descendants .3 3  There was some settle-
ment discussion inJanuary 1997 between the Swiss Government,
Swiss banks, and the lawyers for the parties, although to date,
they have not revealed a settlement agreement.3 31
1. Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland
Representative plaintiff, Gisella Weisshaus, 33 filed a class ac-
tion suit on October 3, 1996 in the United States District Court,
for the Eastern District of New York and an amended complaint
on January 24, 1997. ss The amended complaint names the
325. Id.
326. Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849; Friedman, No. 96 CV 5161; World Council, No. 97
CV 0461.
327. See Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849, Am. Compl. I 1 (alleging that defendants con-
cealed and converted assets deposited in accounts with defendants' banks prior to
1946); Friedman, No. 96 CV 5161, Compl. 1 (alleging that defendants profited by
laundering Nazi money and preventing recovery of assets in bank accounts); World
Council, No. 97 CV 0461, Compl. I 1 (alleging that defendants accepted money and
other assets deposited by class members and for 50 years concealed their illegal conduct
and refused to acknowledge such assets or return them to rightful owners).
328. Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849, Am. Compl. 11 4-7.
329. Friedman, No. 96 CV 5161, Compl. 11 16-43.
330. World Council, No. 97 CV 0461, Compl. 1 6-25.
331. Swiss Set to Settle, supra note 8, at 1. Plaintiffs in the Weisshaus suit expected
Swiss banks to offer an initial US$100 million to US$250 million. Id.
332. Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849, Am. Compl. 4. Plaintiff Gizella Weisshaus is a 66
year old U.S. citizen residing in Brooklyn, New York. Id. Ms. Weisshaus survived the
German concentration camp at Auschwitz, Poland and emigrated to the United States
in 1950. Id.
333. Id. Am. Compl. 5-7. The amended complaint included three additional
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Union Bank of Switzerland, the Swiss Bank Corporation, Credit
Suisse, the Swiss Bankers Association, and the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlement as joint defendants.33 4 The suit charges that
the banks failed to return valuables thatJewish owners deposited
in defendants' banks.33 5 The suit also charges that the Nazis de-
posited much of the vast wealth confiscated from Jews in Swiss
banks. 36 To support these charges, the suit states six causes of
action upon which relief should be granted, including breach of
contract,3 37 accounting,3 8 breach of fiduciary duty,3 3 9 conver-
sion, 34  conspiracy,3 4 and unjust enrichment.3 4  The suit de-
representative plaintiffs. Id. Plaintiff Joshua Lustmann is a 55 year old Israeli citizen
residing in Jerusalem. Id. Am. Compl. 5. Mr. Lustmann avoided arrest by the Nazi
regime by hiding and obtaining false identification papers. Id. His father and other
family perished in a concentration camp. Id. Plaintiff Rudolfine Schlinger is an 89 year
old U.S. citizen residing in Queens, New York. Id. Am. Compl. 1 6. Ms. Schlinger
avoided arrest and deportation to a concentration camp by moving from Austria to
England in 1938. Id. Her family members died in concentration camps before 1945.
Id. Plaintiff Estelle Sapir is a 70 year old legal resident of the U.S. residing in Queens,
New York. Id. Am. Compl. 7. Ms. Sapir survived her 1943 arrest and placement in a
detention/deportation camp. Id. Ms. Sapir's father died in a concentration camp. Id.
334. Id. Am. Compl. 11 8-12. According to the amended complaint, the Bank for
International Settlements is a Swiss bank serving as an international clearinghouse for
reparation payments resulting from World War II. Id. Am. Compl. 12.
335. Id. Am. Compl. 1. The Amended Complaint alleges:
Plaintiffs (their heirs and beneficiaries) instituted this proceeding to obtain an
accounting and recover damages arising out of the defendants' participation
in a common scheme and course of conduct (1) to conceal and convert assets
deposited in accounts with the defendant banks prior to 1946; and (2) to be a
depository of and profit from the looting of personal property by the Nazi
Regime and its allies between 1933 and 1945.
Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. Am. Compl. 35-41. Breach of contract arises from unexcused failure to
perform any promise which forms the whole or part of a contract. BLAcK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY, supra note 155, at 188.
338. Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849, Am. Compl. 42-44. Accounting is an action for
equitable relief against one in a fiduciary relation to recover profits taken in breach of
that relation. BLACK's LAw DiCrnONARY, supra note 155, at 20.
339. Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849, Am. Compl. 99 45-50. Breach of fiduciary duty is
the neglect or failure to fulfill the duties of an office or fiduciary employment. BLACK'S
LAW DicriONARY, supra note 155, at 189.
340. Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849, Am. Compl. 11 51-55. Conversion is an unauthor-
ized assumption of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another which de-
prives an owner of his property permanently or for an indefinite time. BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY, supra note 155, at 332.
341. Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849, Am. Compl. 99 56-59. Conspiracy involves the
agreement between one or more persons for the purpose of using means to commit an
unlawful act. BLACK'S LAw DicrONARY, supra note 155, at 309. The means themselves
need not be unlawful for a conspiracy to exist. Id.
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mands judgment against defendants jointly, severally and/or in
the alternative, 43 and requests an accounting, compensatory
damages, exemplary or punitive damages, 3 4 and trial costs.3415
2. Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland
The children of Holocaust victims, as representative plain-
tiffs, filed a class action suit on October 21, 1996 in the United
States District Court, for the Eastern District of New York.346
The suit names the Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Cor-
poration, and Credit Suisse as joint defendants. 47 Additionally,
the complaint names the Swiss Bank Association as a non-de-
fendant co-conspirator of the joint defendants. 348 The allega-
tions concern looted assets,3 4 9 slave labor,3 ° and outstanding
342. Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849, Am. Compl. 11 60-62. Unjust enrichment is a
general principle that a person should not be able to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another and should be required to make restitution of or for property or
benefits received, retained, or appropriated. BLACK's LAW DIcrIONARY, supra note 155,
at 1535.
343. Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849, Am. Compl. 62. Liability is said to be joint and
several when the creditor may demand payment from defendants either separately or
collectively. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY, supra note 155, at 837.
344. Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849, Am. Compl. 1 62. Exemplary or punitive damages
are damages awarded to the plaintiff over and above compensation for loss in an effort
to punish the defendant for acting willfully, maliciously, or fraudulently, or to set an
example for others. BLACK'S LAw DIcIoNARY, supra note 155, at 390.
345. Weisshaus, No. 96 CV 4849, Am. Compl. 62.
346. Friedman, No. 96 CV 5161. PlaintiffJacob Friedman is a 75 year old U.S. citi-
zen residing in Brooklyn, New York. Id. Compl. 16. The Nazis gassed to death both
of Mr. Friedman's parents at Auschwitz in the spring of 1944. Id. Plaintiff Lewis Salton
is an 85 year old U.S. citizen residing in New York City, New York. Id. Compl. 21.
The Nazis executed Mr. Salton's father by gunfire in 1942. Id. His stepmother and
stepsister perished in the Belzec concentration camp in Poland in 1942. Id. Plaintiff
Charles Sonabed is a 65 year old British citizen residing in England. Id. Compl. 32.
Both of Mr. Sonabed's parents perished at Auschwitz. Id. Plaintiff David Boruchowicz
is a 71 year old Canadian citizen residing in Toronto, Canada. Id. Compl. 40. Mr.
Boruchowicz performed slave labor for a German company from 1940 to 1943. Id. The
Nazis transported Mr. Boruchowicz's parents and five sisters to the Majdanak concen-
tration camp, where it is believed they all perished. Id. Compl. 42.
347. Id. Compl. I 44-46.
348. Id. Compl. 1 48. The Swiss Bankers Association is the leading organization of
the Swiss banking and finance industry. BUSINESS LAW GUIDE TO SWITZERLAND 1110,
at 332 (1991). The complaint alleges that the Swiss Bankers Association engaged in
misconduct and continues to engage in misconduct as part of a common scheme
among all the defendants. Friedman, No. 96 CV 5161, Compl. 48-49.
349. Friedman, No. 96 CV 5161, Compl. 2. The complaint defines "Looted as-
sets" as:
[A]ny and all personal, commercial, real, and/or intangible property, includ-
ing cash, securities, goldjewelry, businesses, art masterpieces, equipment and
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bank accounts. 51
The plaintiffs are seeking to certify three separate classes to
represent these different interests. 35 2  Plaintiffs in Class A in-
clude "Rightful Owners of Nazi Regime Looted Assets and/or
Their Heirs."3 53  Class B includes "Slave Laborers and/or Their
Heirs."1 4 Class C includes "Certain Swiss Bank Depositors and/
or Their Heirs."3 5  The plaintiffs have asserted their claims in
twelve separate counts, each on behalf of one, two, or all of the
classes.3 56 For each of these classes, the plaintiffs have requested
intellectual property, that was illegally taken from the ownership or control of
an individual, organization or entity, by means including, but not limited to,
theft, forced transfer and exploitation, during the period of 1933 through
1946 by any person, organization or entity acting on behalf of, or in further-
ance of the acts of, the Nazi Regime, its officials or related entities, in connec-
tion with crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes against peace, genocide,
or any other violations of fundamental human rights.
Id. Compl. 1 9.
350. Id. Compl. 1 2. The Complaint defines slave labor as "work done by an indi-
vidual at the sole discretion and will of another person or entity and for which no, or
insubstantial compensation is paid, often under circumstances that include confine-
ment" Id. Compl. 11.
351. Id. Compl. 2. The suit claims that the defendant Swiss banks participated in
a common scheme and course of conduct to:
(1) [L]aunder Nazi Regime... money and fund and profit from Nazi World
War II atrocities; (2) knowingly and/or recklessly accept looted or cloaked
assets stolen or forcibly taken by the Nazi Regime during World War II; (3)
knowingly and/or recklessly accept profits generated by Nazi Regime forced
slave laborers; and (4) act intentionally and in concert to conceal and prevent
the recovery of assets deposited in Swiss banks by victims of the Nazi Regime.
Id. Compl. 1.
352. Id. Compl. 2.
353. Id. The complaint defines "Rightful Owners of Nazi Regime Looted Assets
and/or Their Heirs" as "[a]ll persons or entities (or their heirs) from whom the Nazi
Regime obtained looted assets, as defined above, which assets were in whole or in part
the subject of any transaction executed by or through a Swiss bank." Id. Compl. 200.
354. Id. Compl. 2. The complaint defines "Slave Laborers and/or Their Heirs"
as:
All persons (or their heirs) who were forced to work as slave laborers for the
benefit of Nazi Regime entities, the profits from which were deposited in, liq-
uidated by, or laundered through, commercial transactions with the Swiss
banks, which transactions included in whole or in part the profits derived
from that slave labor.
Id. Compl. 200.
355. Id. Compl. 2. The complaint defines "Swiss Bank Depositors and/or Their
Heirs" as: "All persons or entities (or their heirs) who were persecuted, or feared perse-
cution, for religious, racial or political reasons by the Nazi Regime, who deposited assets
in Swiss banks between 1933 and 1946 and who have not had the proceeds of these
deposits returned to them." Id. Compl. 200.
356. Id. Compl. 207-294. The counts are as follows: Count I: Conspiracy to
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that the court order an identification and accounting of all
looted assets and applicable accounts, and a constructive trust as
well as the disgorgement of any and all looted assets, profits
from slave labor, and accounts, respectively. 57
3. World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communities, Inc. v. Union
Bank of Switzerland
The World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communities, Inc.
("World Council") and several of its members filed a class action
suit on January 29, 1997 in the United States District Court, for
the Eastern District of New York. 5 8 The suit names the Union
Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation, and Credit Suisse
as joint defendants.3 59 Additionally, the complaint names the
Swiss Bank Association as a non-defendant co-conspirator of the
joint defendants. 360 The allegations concern deposited assets, 61
Violate and/or Complicity in Violations of International Law; Count II: Breach of Fidu-
ciary Duty; Count III: Breach of Special Duty; Count IV: Breach of Contract; Count V:
Conversion; Count VI: Unjust Enrichment; Count VII: Negligence; Count VIII: Viola-
tions of Swiss Federal Banking Law; Count IX: Violations of Swiss Commercial Code of
Obligations; Count X: Conspiracy; Count XI: Fraud; and Count XII: Fraudulent Con-
cealmenL Id.
357. Id. Cmpl. 294.
358. World Council, No. 97 CV 0461. Plaintiff World Council is an organization
representing hundreds of constituent communuities comprised of Holocaust survivors
and their descendants. Id. Compl. 11 6-7. Plaintiff Irene Zarkowski was born in 1927
and is now a U.S. citizen residing in Brooklyn, New York. Id. Compl. 1 12,15. Ms.
Zarkowski survived deportation and the Lunz Am Za work camp and was liberated from
Theresienstadt concentration camp in 1945. Id. Compl. 11 13-15. Plaintiff Joseph
Wiedner was born in 1923 and is now a U.S. citizen residing in Brooklyn, New York. Id.
Compl. 16,19. Mr. Wiedner survived forced labor at Auschwitz and Bochum and was
liberated from Buchenwald in 1945. Id. Compl. 1 18. Plaintiff Erwin Hauer was born
in 1925 and is now a U.S. citizen residing in Brooklyn, New York. Id. Compl. II 20,22.
Mr. Hauer survived deportation, forced labor, and the Strasshoff concentration camp,
from which the Allies liberated him in 1945. Id. Compl. 21. Plaintiff Lillie Ryba was
born in 1924 and is now a U.S. citizen residing in Brooklyn, New York. Id. Compl. 11
23, 25. Ms. Ryba survived Auschwitz and the Husnfeld work camp. Id. Compl. 7 23-
24.
359. Id. Compl. 26-28.
360. Id. Compl. 30. The complaint alleges that the Swiss Bankers Association
engaged in misconduct and continues to engage in misconduct as part of a common
scheme among all the defendants. Id.
361. Id. Compl. 1 2. The complaint defines "Deposited Assets" as:
[A]ny and all assets deposited in the Swiss Banks, including, but not limited to,
cash, securities, bonds, gold, jewels or jewelry, or any other tangible items of
personal property, or any documents indicating ownership or possessory inter-
ests in real, personal or intangible property, by persons who were persecuted
by the Nazi Regime, its officials or related entities.
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looted assets, 3 62 and slave labor.3 63
The plaintiffs are seeking to certify four separate classes to
represent these different interests.164 Plaintiffs in Class A in-
clude "Swiss Bank Depositors and/or Their Heirs." 65 Plaintiffs
in Class B include "Rightful Owners of Nazi Regime Looted As-
sets and/or Their Heirs."311 Class C includes "Rightful Owners
of Nazi Regime Looted Communal Assets and/or Their
Heirs."367 Class D includes "Slave Laborers and/or Their
Heirs." 68 The plaintiffs have asserted their claims in eight sepa-
rate counts, each on behalf of one or all of the classes. 69 For
each of these classes, the plaintiffs have requested that the court
Id. at 20 n.15.
362. Id. Compl. 2. The complaint defines "Looted Assets" as:
[A]ny and all personal, commercial, real, and/or intangible property, includ-
ing cash, securities, gold, jewelry, religious artifacts, texts, businesses, art mas-
terpieces, equipment and intellectual property, that was illegally taken from
the ownership or control of an individual, organization or entity, by means
including, but not limited to, theft, forced transfer or exploitation, by the Nazi
Regime, its officials or related entities.
Id. at 27 n.21.
363. Id. Compl. 2. The Complaint defines slave labor as "work done by an indi-
vidual at the sole discretion and will of another person or entity and for which no, or
insubstantial, compensation is paid, often under circumstances that include confine-
ment." Id. at 33 n.31.
364. Id. Compl. 96.
365. Id. The complaint defines "Swiss Bank Depositors and/or Their Heirs" as
"[a]ll persons or entities (or their heirs) who feared persecution from the Nazi Regime
and who deposited assets in the Swiss banks between 1933 and 1945 and who have not
had the assets returned to them." Id.
366. Id. The complaint defines "Rightful Owners of Nazi Regime Looted Assets
and/or Their Heirs" as "[a]ll persons or entities (or their heirs) whose assets were
looted by the Nazi Regime or its agents, which assets were in whole or in part the
subject of any transaction executed by or through a Swiss bank." Id.
367. Id. Compl. 2. The complaint defines "Rightful Owners of Nazi Regime
Looted Communal Assets and/or Their Heirs" as "[a] 11 communities that are presently
identified by their descendance from communities that previously existed in Europe,
whose communal assets were looted by the Nazi Regime, or its agents, which assets were
in whole or in part the subject of any transaction executed by or through the Swiss
Banks." Id.
368. Id. The complaint defines "Slave Laborers and/or Their Heirs" as "[a]ll per-
sons (or their heirs) who worked under slave laborer conditions established by the Nazi
Regime, or its agents, and the profits from which labor was the subject of any transac-
tion executed by or through the Swiss Banks." Id.
369. Id. Compl. 102-148. The counts are as follows: Count I: Breach of Fiduci-
ary Duty; Count II: Breach of Contract; Count III: Conversion; Count IV: Unjust En-
richment; Count V: Negligence; Count VI: Conspiracy, Count VII: Accounting; and
Count VIII: Conspiracy to Violate and/or Complicity in Violations of International
Law. Id.
1362 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1306
order an identification and accounting, a constructive trust, and
the disgorgement to the classes with respect to dormant ac-
counts, looted assets, and profits from slave labor.3 70
E. The Volcker Commission
On May 2, 1996, members of the Swiss Bankers Association
and leading members of the representative Jewish organizations
signed a two-page Memorandum of Agreement, 371 setting forth
the framework for an Independent Committee of Eminent Per-
sons (the "Volcker Commission") designed to oversee an audit
of dormant bank accounts and other assets and financial instru-
ments deposited before, during, and immediately after World
War 11.372 The Volcker Commission's goal is to facilitate the re-
turn of money in dormant accounts to relatives and heirs of vic-
tims of the Holocaust.373 The Volcker Commission's priorities
will be to define the term "dormant accounts," to determine how
to decide which accounts are 'Jewish," and to match claims to
assets. 3 7 4 By the terms of the agreement, the Volcker Commis-
sion is required to assure that the Swiss Government addresses
the issue of unreported looted assets.3 7 5 Volcker Commission
members include three Swiss representatives appointed by the
Swiss Bankers Association, and three Jewish representatives ap-
pointed by the World Jewish Restitution Organization. 6 Mr.
Paul Volcker, the former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve
Board, is leading the Volcker Commission.3 77
370. Id. Compl. 148.
371. Volcker Agreement, supra note 8. Signatories included Edgar M. Bronfman,
President of the World Jewish Congress; Avraham Burg, Chairman of the Jerusalem-
based Jewish Agency; Zvi Barak, for the World Jewish Congress; Israel Singer, Secretary
General of the World Jewish Congress; Dr. Georg F. Krayer, Chairman of the Swiss
Bankers Association; Dr. Josef Ackerman, Board member of the Swiss Bankers Associa-
tion; and Hans J. Baer, chairman of Baer Holding Ltd. and Bank Julius Baer. Id.
372. See id. para. 3 (defining Volcker Commission's jurisdiction).
373. Walter Russell Mead, Holocaust; Gentleman Bankers? HahI Swiss Used 'Paraguay'
Rules, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1996, at 1.
374. Clock Ticks, supra note 286, at 7.
375. Id. The Volcker Agreement requires the Volcker Commission to "cooperate
to assure that the Swiss government will deal with the question of looted assets in Swiss
banks or other institutions which were not reported or returned under the relevant laws
during the years before, during and immediately after the Second World War." Volcker
Agreement, supra note 8, para. 5.
376. Volcker Agreement, supra note 8, para. 1.
377. Joint Committee Will Help Trace Funds in Swiss Bank (NATIONAL PUBLIc RADIO
broadcast, May 5, 1995) (1996 WL 4370407).
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Members of three international auditing firms 78 will first
examine the general procedure of opening accounts in Swiss
banks, followed by an audit of four representative Swiss banks.3 79
Auditors will use the results to facilitate the remaining audits.3 8 1
They will trace the claims of Holocaust survivors and heirs on a
case-by-case basis, under the supervision of the Volcker Commis-
sion.3 8' The Swiss Bankers Association has promised auditors
unfettered access to all relevant files in Swiss banks.3 82 Any heir-
less assets recovered from accounts will reportedly go to Jewish
charities.3 83  The Volcker Commission's first report is not ex-
pected before the summer of 1997.384
III. PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR RENDERING FINALITY AND
CLOSURE THAT CURRENT MECHANISMS ARE
UNSUITED TO OFFER
The Swiss Banking Ombudsman, the Volcker Commission,
and U.S. class action suits all suffer from critical drawbacks
which render them incapable of offering definitive results to
many claimants.385 Conversely, each mechanism does have cer-
tain beneficial aspects which would successfully resolve claims if
not for the countervailing deficiencies. An effective alternative
is a hybrid mechanism based in part on the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms which is designed to
hear claims and to render binding decisions in an effort to pro-
vide finality to claimants and to Swiss banks.
378. See SWiSS-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF CONGRESS, Switzerland Dormant Accounts, Nazi-
Gold and Loot (2d ed. 1987) (naming Arthur Andersen, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Price-
Waterhouse as three international auditing firms working under Volcker Commission),
available in <http://www.amcham.ch/Swissaccounts.html> (also on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal).
379. The Newsletter of the Geneva Private Bankers Association, Switzerland and World War
II: What Has Been Done to Shed Light on the Past, (visited March 2, 1997) <http://www/
geneve-finance.ch/En/Letter-gbpg2.htm> (also on file with the Fordham International
LawJournal).
380. Id.
381. Volcker Agreement, supra note 8, paras. 3, 4.
382. Id., para. 3.
383. Rayner Pike, Swiss Search For Jews' Assets, BOSTON GLOBE, May 5, 1996, at 26.
384. Swiss Envoy in U.S., supra note 321.
385. See, e.g., supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (noting that only five per-
cent of inquiries filed with Swiss Banking Ombudsman satisfied threshold requirements
for consideration).
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A. Problems with the Current Mechanisms
The Swiss Banking Ombudsman and the Volcker Commis-
sion are conducting inquires using incomplete bank files which
makes them unable to render definitive results in many cases.38 6
The class action suits are likely to be equally ineffective because
of obstacles to certification which are likely to preclude the pro-
gress of the suits.3 87 The international nature of the dispute also
invites problems for class action suits, as the court has reason to
grant a dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens
Efforts of the Swiss and U.S. Governments to collect historical
information will do little to settle claims as those conducting the
studies lack the authority to settle claims.
1. The Swiss Banking Ombudsman and Volcker Commission
Are Relying on Incomplete Files Which Render
Them Unable to Conclusively Settle Claims
The Swiss Banking Ombudsman and the Volcker Commis-
sion will not be able to appropriately settle the problem of dor-
mant Swiss bank accounts because they are relying on Swiss bank
files. 389 The bank files are admittedly incomplete as the Swiss
banks' practice has been to discard documents ten years after
the end of the bank-customer relationship. 390 As a result, an in-
quiry via the Swiss Banking Ombudsman or the Volcker Commis-
sion can only yield definitive results when information is avail-
able.391 For such lucky claimants, documents should be available
because accounts are maintained indefinitely.392 For the rest of
the claimants, however, a negative result is inconclusive.393
386. See supra note 305 and accompanying text (discussing banks' policy of dis-
carding files).
387. See supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text (discussing certification re-
quirements for class action suits).
388. See supra note 277 (defining forum non conveniens).
389. See, e.g., supra note 295 (discussing Swiss Banking Ombudsman's inquiries
made to Swiss banks); supra note 372 and accompanying text (discussing materials avail-
able to auditors under Volcker Commission).
390. See supra note 305 and accompanying text (discussing bank practice of dis-
carding documentation ten years after customer terminated account).
391. See, e.g., supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (noting that Swiss Banking
Ombudsman uncovered assets in only eleven of 1055 inquiries).
392. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing Switzerland's treat-
ment of dormant bank accounts).
393. See supra notes 298-99 (noting that Swiss Banking Ombudsman chose not to
pursue 1000 of 1055 inquires).
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Since World War II, Swiss banks have terminated accounts
whose balances could not support the maintenance fees.3 9 4 Also
affected are claimants whose accounts the Swiss Government liq-
uidated pursuant to the 1962 Federal Resolution which estab-
lished the Unclaimed Assets Fund for heirless assets. 3  The Fed-
eral Resolution lapsed in 1974, so it is likely that Swiss banks
have since discarded the documents relating to the liquidated
accounts.396 Swiss historians have addressed weaknesses in the
application and enforcement of the Federal Resolution which
affected its overall effectiveness.3 97 The Swiss bankers, however,
have failed to acknowledge these same shortcomings when rely-
ing on the Federal Resolution to explain their own poor re-
sults. 398
Claimants lacking the personal documents are unable also
even to initiate a bank search, because they are without the doc-
umentation needed to establish an inheritance claim as required
by the Swiss Banking Ombudsman. 99 The Swiss Banking
Ombudsman's evidentiary threshold closely resembles the re-
quirements which hindered heirs' post World War II attempts to
claim bank accounts." ° Post World War II claimants lacked req-
uisite documentation because when Hitler liquidated villages, he
did so indiscriminately, destroying important papers like wills,
birth certificates, and marriage licenses.4 °1
394. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Swiss banks' legal right
to terminate accounts).
395. See supra notes 134-54 and accompanying text (discussing Resolution's liqui-
dation of non-Swiss accounts valued under sFr 500 and later under sFr 1000).
396. See supra note 143 (noting that Federal Resolution remained in force until
August 31, 1974); supra note 305 and accompanying text (noting Swiss banks' disposal
of documents ten years after termination of bank accounts); supra note 153 and accom-
panying text (discussing liquidation of trivial accounts pursuant to 1962 Federal Resolu-
tion).
397. See supra notes 147-54 (discussing poor enforcement and implementation of
Federal Resolution).
398. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text (explaining why inquiries to
Swiss Banking Ombudsman have not uncovered many assets).
399. See supra note 297 (setting forth Swiss Banking Ombudsman's requirements
for initiating search).
400. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (setting forth that claimants' needed
bank documentation and inheritance documents to claim accounts).
401. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing Hitler's pillaging of vil-
lages).
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2. The Inability to Satisfy the Certification Requirements Will
Render the Class Action Suits Ineffective for
Resolving Claims
All three of the class action suits face serious certification
challenges that threaten the success of global class action
suits.4 0 2 The international nature of the cases invites motions for
dismissal or change of venue based on forum non conveniens 4'0 3
and brings into question the overall appropriateness of resolving
international claims in U.S. courts.4 0 4 Similar to the concerns
surrounding the Swiss Banking Ombudsman and the Volcker
Commission, much of the information needed to successfully es-
tablish a claim may have been destroyed or be otherwise unavail-
able, thus, limiting the likelihood of successfully establishing a
claim.4 °5
With respect to certification, the current class actions face
some of the same concerns which led the Third Circuit to decer-
tify the class in the Amchem case." 6 Regarding commonality, 40 7
the varied source of claims is likely to be too inconsistent for the
court to certify the plaintiffs as a class.408 Also, the classes con-
tain future claimants whose numbers will likely increase as coun-
tries continue to decertify documents. This will present the
same conflict of interest between the current and future claim-
ants that class plaintiffs faced in Amchem, in which current claim-
ants will seek to maximize front-end payments, while the future
claimants' interests lie in maximizing the overall size of the
402. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text (setting forth certification re-
quirements for class action suits).
403. See supra note 277 (defining and discussing forum non conveniens).
404. See supra notes 278-79 (setting forth reasoning for court's nonintervention).
405. See supra note 305 and accompanying text (setting out banks policy on dis-
carding documentation); supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing Hitler's
conquering ofJewish villages).
406. See supra notes 263-70 and accompanying text (discussing Amchem court's rea-
sons for decertifying class).
407. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing commonality require-
ment).
408. See, e.g., Friedman, Compl. 1 16-43 (noting differences in plaintiffs' claims).
In one case, a named plaintiff claims an account was established in his father's name,
while in another, a named plaintiff believes an alias was used. Id. Moreover, the plain-
tiffs refer to a variety of proof, from recollections to reports. Id. Finally, not all of the
plaintiffs have exhausted the same avenues for claiming their accounts. Id.
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fund.4"9 These conflicting interests undermine the require-
ments of typicality and adequacy of representation because cur-
rent representative plaintiffs do not effectively represent the in-
terests of people with potential claims.41° Finally, the dispute in-
volves documentation dating from over fifty years ago,411
implicates Switzerland's three largest commerical banks41 and
the Swiss National Bank,413 and includes plaintiffs located in sev-
eral countries.414 When coupled with the future claims and fair-
ness concerns, it becomes impossible to conclude that this class
action is superior to alternative means of adjudication which will
probably lead the court to dismiss the actions.415
Looking to precedence for guidance, U.S. courts have a his-
tory of dismissing international claims in deference to more fit-
ting tribunals.41 6 In the present cases, the existence of U.S.
plaintiffs41 7 may balance out the U.S. interest in not damaging
relations with Switzerland because of the capital they supply to
U.S. business.41 8 Accordingly, in deciding the fate of current
claims, if the court were to consider the Swiss Government's reg-
ulation of Swiss banks and were to apply the Union Carbide Corp.
rationale for granting forum non conveniens,419 the Court will
409. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing inclusion of future
claimants in class action suit).
410. Id.
411. See, e.g., supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing information pro-
vided in declasified documents).
412. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing commercial banks' strict
requirements for requesting status of bank accounts).
413. See supra note 2 (discussing Swiss National Bank's acceptance of shipments of
Nazi gold).
414. See supra note 346 (noting that representative plaintiffs in Friedman class ac-
tion suit are U.S., British, and Canadian citizens).
415. See, e.g., supra note 270 and accompanying text (setting forth complexities
that make class action suit impracticable).
416. See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text (discussing courts reluctance to
intervene in international disputes). In such instances, courts will dismiss cases on the
grounds of forum non conveniens. See, e.g., supra notes 277-79 (defining and illustrat-
ing dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens).
417. See supra note 298 (noting that 306 of 1055 inquires submitted to Swiss Bank-
ing Ombudsman are from United States).
418. See supra note 271 (noting that courts require highly persuasive arguments
when case involves U.S. plaintiffs and providing examples of courts forum non con-
veniens balancing test).
419. See supra notes 277.79 and accompanying text (setting forth rationale for
courts nonintervention policy).
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likely choose to rule consistently with its earlier rationale and
dismiss the claims in favor of a more appropriate tribunal.
3. The Swiss Government's and U.S. Government's Fact-
Finding Attempts Lack the Authority to Settle Claims
Which Effectively Limits Their Utility
The Swiss Government and U.S. Government limited their
activity concerning dormant accounts to reviews of historical
facts. This effectively limits their usefulness for the proposed
mechanism. The Swiss Government first commissioned the His-
torians' Report 420 and then established the ICEC421 to review
and to gather information regarding the dormant accounts, but
their authority is limited to gathering information. Neither is
authorized to settle claims. Similarly, the U.S. Congress con-
ducted hearings intended to inquirie into the future of assets
held in dormant Swiss bank accounts422 and the Swiss Govern-
ment's committment to resolve issues surrounding the ac-
counts.423
B. Proposal
Under the previous and current mechanisms for pursuing
claims, only those satisfying strict documentation requirements
will be successful.424 What is needed is a binding adjudicatory or
arbitral mechanism for those claimants left unsatisfied by inquir-
ies made via the Volcker Commission or the Swiss Banking
Ombudsman.4 25 This dispute warrants a forum that will offer fi-
nality to both claimants and Swiss banks. Accordingly, the par-
ties establishing the Volcker Commission should formalize their
positions and create an international mechanism that would al-
low for equitable, binding resolutions of claims and which is sen-
sitive to the specialized needs of this dispute.
420. See supra note 307 and accompanying text (discussing Historians' Report).
421. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (discussing the Commission's
goals).
422. See supra notes 318-21 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Senate hear-
ing).
423. See sup-a notes 322-25 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. House hear-
ing).
424. See supra notes 112-17 (discussing obstacles encountered by unsuccessful
claimants).
425. See supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (noting that 95% of claimants
returning completed questionnaire couldn't meet evidentiary threshold).
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1. Role
The Swiss Banking Ombudsman and Volcker Commission
offer efficient starting places for claimants. Both offer an estab-
lished and predicatable method for claiming dormant Swiss
bank accounts.426 This will act to filter out the easy-to-settle
claims where the requisite documents are available.427 For the
vast majority of claims left unsettled by these mechanisms 428 the
processes may yield useful information relating to the existence
of an account or the value of a previously liquidated account.
A binding arbitral forum is necessary to resolve the remaining
claims.
The proposed forum is also necessary because neither the
Foundation 429 nor the Humanitarian Fund430 intend to resolve
the issue of the dormant accounts. 43 1 The role of the proposed
forum depends in part on whether the Swiss Government suc-
cessfully establishes the Foundation.43 2 If the Government gar-
ners the needed support, the Foundation will obviate any further
need for the Swiss banks' Humanitarian Fund.433 Assets remain-
ing from the Humanitarian Fund could be used to help fund the
forum's settlements. If, on the other hand, the opposition to the
Foundation prevents the Swiss Government from establishing
the Foundation, then the proposed forum would act to supple-
ment the Humanitarian Fund, and would dovetail with the
Volcker Commission and the Swiss Banking Ombudsman.
Claims not settled by the Volcker Commission or the Swiss Bank-
426. See supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text (discussing Swiss Banking
Ombudsman's method for inquiry); supra notes 378-383 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Volcker Commission procedure for auditing dormant bank accounts).
427. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing Swiss banks' main-
tenance of dormant bank accounts).
428. See, e.g., supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (noting that only 55 of
1055 claims met Swiss Banking Ombudsman's threshold requirements).
429. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing Swiss Government's
Swiss Foundation for Solidarity).
430. See supra note 25 (discussing Swiss Banks' Humanitarian Fund).
431. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (setting forth uses for Foundation);
supra note 29 (noting that Humanitarian Fund will not prejudice claims to dormant
Swiss bank accounts).
432. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing details and opposi-
tion of Swiss Foundation for Solidarity).
433. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing US$140 million fund
established by Swiss banks for Holocaust survivors).
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ing Ombudsman would be eligible for settlement under the pro-
posed forum.
2. Design
An ad hoc arbitral tribunal would best serve the interests of
the parties as claims would be resolved efficiently" 4 and would
give representative parties the responsibility of designing the fo-
rum.435 If judges dictated the composition and the applicable
law, then disputing parties would be less inclined to use the fo-
rum.43 6 Allowing representative parties to design the forum
would necessarily ensure that both the claimants' and Swiss
banks' concerns are reflected in the design of the forum.
i. Composition, Applicable Law, and Enforcement
The composition of the proposed forum should mirror that
of the Iran-U.S. Tribunal because of the latitude such a composi-
tion offers representative parties in selecting its members.437
This framework is also fitting because of the similarity in pur-
pose between the Iran-U.S. Tribunal and the proposed tribunal,
namely to facilitate the return of assets. 438 Each representative
party would significantly influence the composition of the panel,
effectively ensuring the claimant's utilization of the forum.43 9
Critics of the Iran-U.S. Tribunal's design note that parties
bringing claims are powerless with respect to composition.440
This concern would not apply here because representative
434. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (discussing efficiency and effec-
tiveness of arbitration).
435. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing flexibility in design of
ad hoc arbitral tribunal).
436. See supra note 204 (noting benefit of ability to design forum); supra note 165
and accompanying text (noting importance of input into design of forum).
437. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (discussing compostion of Iran-
U.S. Tribunal). Mirroring the Iran-U.S. Tribunal, the proposed tribunal would consist
of nine members with three sitting on each panel. Id. Each representative party would
appoint one third of the members, who in turn would select the remaining third of the
members. Id. Members would appoint the President of the tribunal from this final
third. Id. This is similar to the arbitral tribunal Switzerland and the United States
agreed upon to settle disputes arising under their Treaty for Mutual Assistance in Crim-
inal Matters. See supra note 157 (desribing design of arbitral tribunal).
438. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (defining Iran-U.S. Tribunal as
substitute for private claimants in U.S. courts in hopes of facilitating return of assets).
439. See supra note 165 (noting relationship between participation in design and
utilization of forum).
440. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of imbalance
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groups, whose interests are inextricably intertwined with the
claimants' interests, would be determining the composition.
The representative groups would include those that established
the Volcker Commission, namely the World Jewish Restitution
Organization, the World Jewish Congress, and the Swiss Bankers
Association." 1
Furthermore, the tribunal would have an uneven number of
arbitrators, similar to an ICSID tribunal." 2 Unlike the ICISD
tibunal, however, the proposed tibunal could not consist of a
sole arbitrator, thus, ensuring that the process remains fair, equi-
table, and free of bias. The composition would also closely re-
semble that of an ICJ Chamber, but parties using the proposed
tribunal would not have the option of abandoning the forum for
an alternative forum, thereby ensuring the final resolution of all
claims. 4 3
The model for selecting the applicable law should be de-
rived from that used by the ICJ Chambers because it allows par-
ties to determine which law will govern the proceedings.444 The
tribunal would have to avoid a default rule of applying the laws
of the host state because, in this instance, the inheritance and
secrecy laws of Switzerland have already effectively prevented fi-
nal resolution of claims." 3  Instead, by agreement, 446 parties
between governments designing Iran-U.S. Tribunal and individuals bringing claims re-
sulting from design procedure).
441. See Volcker Agreement, supra note 8 (noting groups party to Volcker Agree-
ment).
442. See ICSID Convention, supra note 199 (defining format of ICSID tribunal).
443. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing forum of ICJ Cham-
ber).
444. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (discussing law applied with ICJ
Chamber). Under the ICJ procedure, a Chamber generally applies international law
when adjudicating a case, though parties do possess the ability to determine the appli-
cable law through carefully drafted treaties, conventions, and even special agreements.
Id.; see supra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing sources of ICJ Chamber
rules). Although Article 38 mentions only the use of international conventions for es-
tablishing the applicable law, past cases have allowed parties to use treaties as a source
of ICJ Chamber rules. Id.
445. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for claim-
ants' lack of success); supra notes 298-299 and accompanying text (noting that 95% of
persons submitting completed questionnaires to Swiss Banking Ombudsman were un-
successful).
446. See, e.g., supra note 234 (providing examples of specially drafted agreements
governing applicable law for ICJ Chamber).
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would determine a fair evidentiary threshold," 7 keeping in mind
the abundance of claims" 8 and the missing documentation."'
The class action suits would be helpful for identifying what
constitutes a typical claim45 ° when determining an appropriate
evidentiary threshold. The members of the class action suits
could assist by disclosing the extent of their evidence and the
nature of that evidence. This will prevent the tribunal from
adopting too high a threshold which, to date, has effectively frus-
trated the purpose of the other mechanisms.451
The proposed forum should establish an escrow account
containing funds for the efficient enforcement of settlement
awards similar to the escrow account established under the Iran-
U.S. Tribunal.452 The escrow account would be funded by the
remaining US$68 million in gold from the Tripartite Commis-
sion4 53 and the money provided by the private Swiss banks and
the Swiss National Banks to establish the Humanitarian Fund.4 5 4
In the event of a countersuit to recover duplicate payments or
overpayments, Swiss banks would submit awards against claim-
ants to domestic courts for enforcement. In theory, this would
work under the New York Convention,4 5 where contracting
states recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them
pursuant to their own rules of procedure.45 6
447. See supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (noting that threshold require-
ments for Swiss Bank Ombudsman eliminated 95% of inquires from consideration).
448. See supra note 298 (noting that 2229 people submitted inquires to Swiss Bank
Ombudsman's Central Office during first nine months in existence).
449. See supra note 305 and accompanying text (discussing missing bank documen-
tation); supra note 15 (discussing nonexistence of required inheritance documents).
450. See supra note 259 (discussing what satisifies typicality requirement for class
action suits).
451. See, e.g., supra note 297 (setting forth Swiss Banking Ombudsman's threshold
requirements); supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (noting that only five per-
cent of completed questionnaires satisfied Swiss Banking Ombudsman's threshold re-
quirements).
452. See supra note 185 (describing Iran-U.S. Tribunal's escrow account).
453. See supra note 5 (discussing countries' decision to freeze money to be distrib-
uted under Tripartite Commission).
454. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing Humanitarian Fund es-
tablished to help survivors of Holocaust).
455. See supra note 187 (setting forth purpose of New York Convention).
456. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text (discussing New York Conven-
tion).
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ii. Specialized considerations
The forum's design would reflect the difficulties faced by
claimants to avoid the weaknesses of the current mechanisms.
The burden of proof would reflect the fact that claimants have
little tangible evidence with which to substantiate their claims.45 7
The forum's designers would need to streamline the forum's
procedure because many claimants are elderly and in need of
speedy resolution. The binding nature of the forum may cause
a delay in the submission of claims if claimants choose to wait for
additional declassified information, but this drawback is out-
weighed by the benefit to those claimants seeking to resolve
their claims sooner, rather than later. Also, claimants have in-
centive to submit claims earlier because their assets may become
worthless. 458 To counter any substantial delay, the forum's de-
signers would set an outside time limit for the submission of
claims which would ensure that Swiss banks would benefit from
the final resolution of each and every claim.
CONCLUSION
The parties involved in settling the claims to dormant Swiss
bank accounts should adopt this hybrid model because it over-
comes the impediments which have prevented many claimants
from recovering dormant accounts. This model is superior to all
other mechanisms currently in place as it is specifically designed
to address Swiss bank secrecy laws and the unavailability of requi-
site documentation. This specially designed, international arbi-
tral tribunal, would benefit both sides by allowing claimants-to
recover what is rightfully theirs, and by enabling Swiss banks to
settle residual claims efficiently, effectively, and permanently.
Anything less would result in an irreconcilable injustice.
457. See supra note 305 and accompanying text (discussing banks' disposal of docu-
ments ten years after termination of bank accounts).
458. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (noting that Swiss Banking
Ombudsman uncovered worthless securities).
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